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OPINION 10 maltatoday | WEDNESDAY • 28 NOVEMBER 2018 THE Israeli-Gazan conflict flared up dramatically recently when Gaza militants fired more than 460 rockets and mortar shells into Israel. Iron Dome interceptors shot down about 100 of the projectiles, while most of the rest landed in open fields. But 30 hit popu- lated areas, killing one civilian and injuring 55 more. The barrage was the largest since 2014. It brought Gaza's year-to-date total to 1,124 rockets and shells fired. Israel responded by bomb- ing 172 Hamas and Islamic Jihad targets in Gaza. About 15 Palestinians died and several buildings were flattened. The exchange of blows was surprising in one sense: thanks to Egyptian mediators, the two sides had seemed close to ne- gotiating a truce. That's despite their seemingly incompatible demands regarding military security, economic activity, and prisoner exchanges. But in another sense, the abrupt switch from ceasefire to gunfire was predictable. Both Israel and Gaza have been relying on brinkmanship in dealing with each other. And that bargaining strategy always poses risks that the situation can slip out of control. Brinkmanship is a powerful but risky strategy for resolving disputes. The United States used it successfully during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. It forced the USSR to back down and avoided a nuclear war. But not before the Soviets shot down an American spy plane and nearly torpedoed a war- ship. The strategy was less success- ful during America's 1981 air traffic controller strike. During that labour dispute, neither the controllers' union nor Presi- dent Ronald Reagan would give in. When Reagan ultimately fired the strikers, 11,000 lost their jobs and airline flights were disrupted for months. The Israel-Gaza situation similarly involves each side us- ing brinkmanship to pressure the other. Like the historical examples above, this one dis- plays several key features. First, if the two sides don't eventually reach agreement, they'll suffer a disaster both wish to avoid. Regarding Israel and Gaza, both want to avoid a full-blown war like 2014's Operation Pro- tective Edge. If one erupted, Israel's interceptors and civil defences would limit its casual- ties from Gaza's estimated 20,000 rockets and shells. But such a conflict would still cost its economy several billion dol- lars, like Protective Edge did. Israeli airstrikes and artillery would meanwhile devastate Gaza's already-weak infra- structure. A ground invasion might even topple the Hamas government. A second feature of brink- manship is that both sides deliberately inch toward that mutual disaster. Each pro- claims its determination and willingness to approach the brink. Each hopes the other will concede first. Gaza firepower escalations demonstrate this progression. Militants there started to burn Israeli crops in April. In May, they fired 188 rockets and shells, the first significant bar- rage since 2014. Israel's responses intensified correspondingly. It initially dealt with flaming kites by intercepting them. In June it began firing warning shots near the kite-launching teams. It started targeting them di- rectly in July, resulting first in injuries and then a death. Airstrikes, such as the 50 tons of bombs dropped July 14, were initially used only after rocket attacks. But they became common retaliation for kites too. Brinkmanship's third fea- ture is a growing risk of losing control. Both sides may fully intend to stop short of disaster. But they know it's increasingly likely they'll accidentally slip over the brink. This has happened several times in Gaza. While Hamas rules Gaza, it has limited control over Islamic Jihad and other militant groups. Islamic Jihad reportedly started the May rocket barrage, with Hamas only belatedly joining in. A sniper reportedly af- filiated with "rogue" militants wounded an Israeli soldier near the border in July. And in October, an accidentally launched rocket destroyed an Israeli home. Such risks are amplified by hair-trigger retaliations that allow little room for error. After July's rogue sniper attack, Israeli forces promptly at- tacked Hamas installations and killed three Palestinians. Gaza militants responded by firing nine rockets. That triggered seven more Israeli airstrikes. The entire escalation cycle took only a day. Israel's control has slipped too. In August an army patrol mistook a Hamas military ex- ercise for a sniper attack. The patrol's gunfire killed two mili- tants. And last week's violence began when Israeli spies were discovered during a mission in Gaza; one was shot dead. Israeli politicians have also stumbled. Facing public frus- tration with the conflict, Israeli politicians have competed to sound the most belligerent. For the time being, Israel and Gaza have resumed their shaky ceasefire. But absent some miracle, the violent instability seems likely to continue, leaving the two sides only one incident away from war Israel-Gaza brinkmanship slips over the brink Michael J. Armstrong Michael J. Armstrong is Associate Professor of Operations Research at the Goodman School of Business, Brock University theconversation.eu Michael J. Armstrong Even the minister of education has called for war. Such tough-talk may have seemed like mere posturing. But when the Israeli gov- ernment agreed to resume the ceasefire last week, the defence minister resigned in protest. (That gave Hamas cause to celebrate.) The coun- try's coalition government consequently may collapse and trigger early elections. For the time being, Israel and Gaza have resumed their shaky ceasefire. But absent some miracle, the violent instability seems likely to continue, leaving the two sides only one incident away from war. The ruins of the Hamas TV station building in Gaza