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11 THE "imminent" departure of the UK from the European Union triggered initiatives to ramp up a common security and defence policy for Europe. In the past the British had frowned on such ideas, argu- ing that European defence needed to remain embedded in NATO, period. Brexit gave EU defence proposals a new impetus. France had always been at the forefront to promote a Eu- ropean defence policy, with Germany attentive but cool. As the Union enlarged to twenty eight members, some entrants from the east wanted to see a substantive posture of European solidarity emerge in their regard. Whether justified or not, they feared Russian intentions. Since 2016, an expanding core of proposals fleshing out a common security and de- fence policy entered the main- stream of EU discourse. In addition to Brexit, what gave them political steam were the stand-off with Russia over its annexation of the Crimea, plus the arrival at the White House of Donald Trump and his cavalier treatment of the NATO connection. The linkage with anti-terror- ism cooperation on a Europe- an scale also gave traction to common security and defence proposals. Coordination A framework for coordina- tion of security and defence matters dubbed PESCO, for- malised in December 2017, had been functioning for quite a while though its impact was less than game changing. However it promoted coordi- nated joint interventions out- side the EU by member states, in exercises that ran mostly on a civilian basis while really being tied to military goals, as in sub-Saharan Africa. Argu- ments that such approaches needed to be consolidated and upgraded now became more insistent. So, the Juncker Commission proceeded to develop a "new" strategy, starting from the competences inherent in the European single market pro- ject. Over the years, defence research, production and pro- curement had continued to develop along national lines, making for uneconomic choic- es when member states bought military hardware. By promoting a unified mar- ket for research and develop- ment in the first instance, cross border cooperation in development and purchasing matters would be promoted. The resulting economies of scale, besides making bet- ter sense of defence projects, would automatically help member states converge to- wards a common defence pol- icy. To this end, the Commis- sion set up a defence fund that should really take off in the twenties, intended to under- write military R&D projects. For 2019-2020, 500 million euros were allocated, much of which went into funding for military drones. In parallel, further plans were laid out to deepen mili- tary strategic arrangements between EU defence minis- tries with a view to having a fully blown European defence policy in place by the mid- twenties. Unsurprisingly, the French remained at the fore- front of these efforts. The Bal- tic states, Greece and Cyprus among others seemed to be just as interested... Rationales However, beyond consider- ing how the goals set for a se- curity and defense policy are going to be achieved, we need to evaluate the rationale for a European defence and security policy. Palpably, a European rationale exists for a security policy that covers terrorism and border surveillance and control. The open internal borders that exist, given the free movement of people in- side the EU as well as Shengen, make terrorism and irregular immigration two issues which can best be tackled on a Euro- pean basis. But what beyond them, justi- fies a stand-alone "European" dimension to defence? The EU is made up of coun- tries which are NATO mem- bers (the majority) and others which are neutral. The NATO connection obligates all its members to rally behind any member which is threatened by acts of war. Should a Eu- ropean defence policy have a similar commitment cover- ing all EU member states? If the answer is no, should there be an arrangement by which those member states which favour a defence policy do so within a subset of EU institu- tions? This after all, is what happens with the eurozone and Shengen, among others. However, doing the same in such a sensitive area of policy as defence, risks enhancing the likelihood of future rifts, pos- sibly to a greater extent than for other policy areas. Moreover, the question re- mains as to how to define the interests that a European de- fence policy would stand for. Independently of the overlap with NATO, different mem- ber states will define their in- terests in terms of, naturally, their contingent concerns, rather than a European per- spective. I met MEPs from the Baltic states whose focus was – Russia; from Greece and Cyprus whose focus was – Turkey; and from France whose focus was – central Africa. Such disparate per- spectives do not make for a coherent security and de- fence policy over the long term. They might indeed in- crease the probability of an incoherent military doctrine to implement stated and implied objectives – which would compound the risks of conflict, not contain them. Maltese perspective From a Maltese perspective, my personal view is that the cornerstone should remain neutrality. This approach has to be carefully modulated to reflect the changed circum- stances since the first time the island's neutrality policy was framed. As such, I disagree that Malta should join in a uni- fied EU security and defence policy, excepting where anti- terrorism and surveillance of EU frontiers are involved. It would be in our interests to have this policy segment man- aged in an autonomous man- ner nationally, but in close, participative fusion with other EU national authorities. By contrast, we should stay away from moves intended to deepen cooperation and pan- European policy making on defence matters. We could do so without raising any objec- tions to their establishment among the willing. Nor should we object to measures that seek to promote cooperation and convergence among pro- viders of EU defence systems. True, we will get little to no benefits from this, since we make no significant inputs to the European defence indus- try. And our contribution to the EU budget would theoreti- cally also be "financing" such an initiative. Though out of it, we should still monitor closely how any European security and defence policy shapes up. Quite likely, as new emergencies crop up, the unintended consequences of future developments will af- fect our security status in ways that we cannot now gauge precisely. So we need to be cautious. In this sector, quick decisions like the one taken in the past to tie us to the euro- zone had best be seen as highly questionable. For much more than in the eurozone narra- tive, a defence and security policy has the potential to open up scenarios that cannot be clearly foreseen. maltatoday | WEDNESDAY • 15 MAY 2019 A European defence policy Alfred Sant is a Labour Party MEP and is seeking reelection OPINION Afred Sant Since 2016, an expanding core of proposals fleshing out a common security and defence policy entered the mainstream of EU discourse www.creditinfo.com.mt info@creditinfo.com.mt Tel: 2131 2344 Your Local Partner for Credit Risk Management Solutions Supporting you all the way maltatoday | WEDNESDAY • 15 MAY 2019