Issue link: https://maltatoday.uberflip.com/i/1199625
17 maltatoday | SUNDAY • 12 JANUARY 2020 INTERVIEW year alone, 120,000 people have fled from Tripoli, and other hu- man tragedies have been taking place across the country. Nonetheless, the GNA remains (for now) the only internationally-recognised government in Libya; yet despite enjoying the support of the United Nations, there has been no international effort to protect it as a legitimate government. Couldn't it be argued, then, that Turkey's offer of military support is a case of stepping in to ensure that the GNA's mandate is respected? That's always a good point; and it is usually – not always – valid for a short period of time. It assumes that the military intervention will be a decisive one, which is hardly ever the case, as one country's support may only trigger more support from a rival. In this respect, the case of Russia and Syria has been an exception, yet the hu- manitarian catastrophe caused in Syria will stay with us for many generations. Whether Turkey is as com- mitted to the cause as the other parties involved – the UAE, Egypt and increasingly Russia – is quite questionable. Its in- volvement may merely contrib- ute to the intensity and length of the conflict. And as the con- flict intensifies, so too will the casualties, and the resulting human tragedies. Ironically, Turkey may not be directly dealing with the consequences of the human toll, but that is rather left for the European Union, and, as the nearest EU country, Malta. Malta has always prided itself on its intense knowledge and experience of Libya, and – up to a certain extent – its ability to mediate between North Africa and Europe. Yet the Maltese government was not invited to the upcoming Libya talks in Germany; nor appears to have been consulted for its expertise at any point in the peace process. Does this indicate a waning of Maltese influence on any ongoing Libyan peace talks? When it comes to negotiat- ing international agreements, local expertise on the ground is often – not always – less rel- evant than having a strong dip- lomatic outreach, or a strong bargaining position. In the case of Libya right now, the big in- ternational players are Turkey and Russia, it seems. This may explain Germany's diplomatic involvement as a possible 'deal- maker'. Germany has very inti- mate relations with both coun- tries. This doesn't mean that it is guaranteed to succeed; but it does mean that Germany has a good bargaining position, from which to try and get at least those two countries to the ne- gotiating table. So, I believe that it is not al- ways the good relations that may exist between countries, or their shared history, that allows countries to play a par- ticular role. Sometimes, it is just big-power diplomacy that allows some countries to pre- sent themselves very forcefully in international diplomacy. Sometimes, however, it is the smaller countries that are bet- ter positioned; because of, among other things, their neu- tral stances. Perhaps ironically, the fact that there has been a history of relations between Malta and Libya – with ups and downs, and lots of controversies – may have impeded Malta from capi- talising on its small, neutral status in this particular case. Having good relations and a shared history doesn't always work to boost the credibility of one's own diplomatic activi- ties. Think of France and Alge- ria, UK and India/Pakistan, or Germany and Israel, and you see that past relations often im- pede diplomatic activity. Recent developments, however, seem to suggest that the European Union is itself divided on the issue of Libya: France and Italy, in particular, appear to backing opposite sides. Does this mean that the EU is no longer a credible player in Libyan peace negotiations, either? What lies at the core here is that there are economic inter- ests; and these interests divide France and Italy, both of which have their own preferences based on their ability to exploit Libya's resources for their own advantage. That is a big prob- lem, because both countries have, from the very beginning, been involved in questions of the economic spoils that are now being divided among those who had preferential agreements with Libya. Both countries also have views on other conflicts in the Mediterranean, surrounding the issue of migration. Italy maybe more so than France; nonetheless, the vision of cre- ating a stable government in Libya is crucial for both coun- tries, as it is for the European Union as a whole. We all want better ways of dealing with the flow of migration that is com- ing through Libya. Up to a point, then, it is al- most natural that the European Union may find itself impeded in its policy responses, because of the underlying questions – some might say 'tensions', but I prefer to call them questions – about what the EU's best inter- ests are, with respect to Libya. Politicians, after all, respond to their own constituencies; so it is difficult for 27+1 member states to agree upon a com- mon policy response, because of the different constituencies that exist within the European Union. As a result, European states usually take up positions against further violence, and in favour of a negotiated settle- ments. In this case, that means supporting the Government of National Accord in Libya and the UN sponsored Peace Plan. So, I think that Europe has a role to play in negotiating the differences that exist in Libya. Often its policies are camou- flaged as 'multilateralism': that is, signing up to the UN-sup- ported peace process, which al- so recognises that the GNA has a mission to conduct a transi- tion process, towards not just peace, but also towards a new form of electoral politics. That is the mission most EU coun- tries have signed up to. But with the conflict itself now shaping this very process, certain questions inevitably arise. Can we continue to sup- port a process that is facing a dead-end? Is it practical? This, I believe, was one of the ques- tions the French President Emmanuel Macron was ask- ing himself, when he suggested opening up the peace talks to all participants in the conflict and invited them to Paris, in- cluding General Haftar. This was immediately criti- cised, on the basis that it would imply 'rewarding' someone for taking violent, military ac- tions; for acting outside the internationally-accepted peace process that Europe is trying to promote. And such criticism is to be expected; up to a point, it is a criticism regularly levelled at 'pragmatism' in internation- al diplomacy… as opposed to the noble but often impractical aim of not rewarding warlords that act outside of the inter- national law and UN provided legitimacy. The two key questions in in- ternational politics and diplo- macy remain the place of eth- ics, and the great uncertainty over wished for outcomes. A narrow-minded focus on inter- ests made France invite Muam- mar Gaddafi to an official state visit in 2007, ensuring not only expensive military purchases, but also cooperation to clamp- down on Sub-Saharan irregular migration through Libya. Shall democratic leaders for- get their values and universal human rights declarations, once foreign policies are con- ducted? Or should they stick to those values – blindly, some- times – and, by extension, ac- cept that UN peace processes have led all participants to a dead-end? In turn, pragmatism can come at an ethical price, and may have long-term im- plications that are difficult to shoulder. hope and pragmatism Photo by JAMES BIANCHI