Issue link: https://maltatoday.uberflip.com/i/1264355
9 maltatoday | SUNDAY • 28 JUNE 2020 INTERVIEW ing for which you were present. So why did it take so long to take action? That is a gratuitous assertion. I cannot comment on Cabinet meetings; but I beg to fully and strongly disagree with that as- sertion. So it wasn't mentioned at that Cabinet meeting? I can't comment on that; but I strongly disagree with that as- sertion. Turning to the Venice Commis- sion recommendations: earlier this month, it was announced that the President of the Re- public – who has already been given the final say on appoint- ments to the judiciary, and other public positions – will be henceforth be appointed by a two-thirds Parliamentary ma- jority. Your government had previously disagreed with that proposal. Why the change of heart? We changed our position, be- cause we appreciated the ar- gument that, if the President is going to choose a judge or a magistrate from a list of three candidates… and we have now removed from the process the Cabinet of Ministers, the Prime Minister, and anything do with the Executive – we would have to give the Office of the Presi- dent more security of tenure. So we gave that executive pow- er to the President instead, for the first time since 1964: and this has to be appreciated as well. From now on, the President will be appointed by a two-thirds majority in the House of rep- resentatives; and also removed by a two-thirds majority… both for the same reasons found in the Constitution, applicable to members of the judiciary. This is a total breakthrough for our country: I don't want to sound bombastic; but this reform is bigger than the 1974 reform of our Republic; and the 1987 reform which introduced proportional representation, and the neutrality clause in our Constitution. These reforms are more far-reaching than those two… Given, however, that past ef- forts to remove sitting judges through a two-thirds majority have so far always proven un- successful… We changed that as well… … but the same measure has now been extended to the President. So what would hap- pen if it proves impossible to reach that level of consensus in Parliament (as has happened in the past)? Wouldn't that pre- cipitate a governability crisis? Also: what would happen if one party succeeds in occupying two-thirds of the House on its own (as could happen in the case of Labour, according to re- cent polls)? Let me answer the second question first. I understand the concern; though I can't com- ment much about it, because if that happens, it would be the democratic will of the people. And I can't say it's not my wish to reach that situation, either; because I am a member of the Labour Party. I have to declare my own interest. But regarding the system it- self: it works. It works with the Ombudsman; it works with the Commissioner for Standards in Public Life; it works with the Auditor General; it is a system that works. As for the first part of the ques- tion: I am very confident that the Opposition will be responsible. We have a good track record on that score, even with the Opposi- tion. I'm going to be fair: I found very valuable help from one of my counterparts, the Hon. Chris Said – because I have practically five counterparts in the Opposi- tion, who cover my ministry – who has been very constructive in contributing to these reforms. And we already have the ex- perience of the appointment of the new Chief Justice: who was appointed by a unanimous vote in the House of Representatives. Again, this is something that never happened since 1964. Under the new proposals, 'the Principal Permanent Secretary will be appointed by the presi- dent on the advice of the cabi- net, after consulting with the Public Service Commission'. This is very similar to the pre- vious mechanism for appoint- ing the President: in which case, government was free to ignore the results of any 'con- sultation'. Is this a case of a superficial change that will still leave the final say in the hands of Cabinet (and therefore at the prime minister's discretion)? No, and I will explain why. First of all, permanent secretar- ies have to enjoy a certain degree of confidence by the administra- tion. Secondly, I believe in the dis- tinction between politicians, and the Civil Service. We have inherited this An- glo-Saxon system, which - ir- respective of what people on the Continent say about it - works well, and has worked for dec- ades. It is a good system. My ex- perience – and I am not 'young' in politics anymore – is that we have very good people in the Civil Service. Even if they come from, or are affiliated with, the opposition party, my impression is that they do a good job, both for the country and the admin- istration. So what we are saying – and this has been noted as a welcome development by the Venice Commission – is that the Prin- ciple Permanent Secretary, who in our system is also the Cabinet secretary, will be appointed by the Cabinet… because Cabinet decisions have to be implement- ed by the administration. So there has to be that link. But – and here is the difference in the new system – permanent secretaries will be selected from a list of candidates given by the Principle Permanent Secretary to the Public Service Commis- sion: in which I have total trust, even in the members nominated by the Opposition leader. The Public Service Commission will choose all the permanent secre- taries; who will then be appoint- ed by the President of Malta. So the Prime Minister will not have a free hand in appointing the Principle Permanent Secre- tary. Ok, you may say that the position will be still chosen by the Cabinet of Ministers… but there is a dilution of powers: and the Venice Commission has rec- ognised this. Regarding 'persons of trust': government is proposing "a maximum number of people who can be engaged as persons of trust in secretariats of min- isters and parliamentary sec- retaries". But was the problem really that there were too many 'persons of trust'… or the lack of transparency in how they were appointed, or conducted their functions? To be frank about it, I think the problem was that people who were appointed as persons of trust, weren't people who were fundamentally attached to min- istries as consultants. That was our main challenge. I believe that every minister has to have a free hand, to a certain extent, to appoint a consultant: because the minister needs to have confidence in the appoin- tee… and up to a point, he has to also trust his loyalty as well. But we needed to regulate the situa- tion, both quantitatively – hence the maximum number – and al- so qualitatively. There is now a manual, pub- lished by the Principle Perma- nent Secretary, with a number of specific principles to regulate this issue. But we didn't stop there: we are going to amend the Public Service Act… and also the law regulating standards in public life, to give the Standards Commissioner more powers to supervise the situation in the re- spective ministries.