Issue link: https://maltatoday.uberflip.com/i/1449240
13 maltatoday | WEDNESDAY • 9 FEBRUARY 2022 OPINION Marcin Kaczmarski & Natasha Kuhrt Marcin Kaczmarski is Lecturer in Security Studies, University of Glasgow Natasha Kuhrt is Lecturer in International Peace & Security, King's College London AGAINST the backdrop of a western diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Winter Olympics, China and Russia have marked the occasion by showing off their increasingly close relation- ship. Russia's president Vladimir Putin posed for pictures with Chinese leader Xi Jinping at the opening of the 2022 Winter Games, declaring their opposi- tion to further enlargement of Nato and calling on the western alliance to "abandon its ideolo- gised cold war approaches". In a joint statement, the two leaders announced a new era in relations that would "know no limits" and be "superior to po- litical and military alliances of the cold war era". Meanwhile they said Nato must "respect the sovereignty, security and inter- ests of other countries … and to exercise a fair and objective atti- tude towards the peaceful devel- opment of other states". In light of Moscow's aggressive stance over Ukraine and equal- ly combative noises emanating from Beijing over the future of Taiwan, many international observers are concerned at the increasingly close relations be- tween the two countries. The chair of UK's parliamen- tary defence committee, Tobias Ellwood recently wrote that the west has only belatedly woken up to the challenge from Russia's increasingly close relationship with China. "Russia provides oil, gas and military hardware. China, in re- turn, provides advanced tech- nology," he wrote, adding that: "Today, we are seeing the birth of a potent anti-democratic al- liance. It is on track to see the world shear into two spheres of competing influence. And we have let it happen." It was not until 2021 that NA- TO explicitly recognised the challenge presented by a Rus- sia-China rapprochement. The two powers declared their "strategic partnership" in the 1990s and have since regular- ly signalled their growing con- vergence, coalescing around a shared antipathy to liberal de- mocracy and opposition to what they perceived as externally sponsored regime change – for example, the "coloured revolu- tions", when popular uprisings pushed such states as Ukraine or Georgia towards closer coopera- tion with the west. But both the 2020-21 protests in Belarus and the stand-off be- tween Russia and the west over Ukraine have created problems for Beijing, which has significant trade and investment ties with both countries which play key roles in China's Belt and Road programme. While the current Rus- sian-western stand-off argua- bly diverts US attention away from Asia-Pacific and Taiwan, China would not want a poten- tial armed conflict in Ukraine to cast a shadow over the Win- ter Olympics. Political signals Given these differences, news of apparent security coopera- tion between the two should be taken with a pinch of salt. While there is growing col- laboration between Chinese and Russian armed forces, the primary function of their mil- itary cooperation consists in political signalling, rather than in preparing for a joint military action. For the past few months, Moscow has been explicit in its support for China's use of mil- itary force as an instrument of pressure on its northeast Asian neighbours, Japan and South Korea. In October, the Russian and Chinese navies conducted their first joint patrol around Japan. In November, strategic bomb- ers from two countries organ- ised their third joint strategic air patrol over the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea, which demonstrated that Russia and China were willing to jointly counter the US-Japanese alli- ance. They had also conducted a joint army drill in northwest China's Ningxia Hui Autono- mous Region in August. Beijing did not, however, re- spond in kind, refraining from support for Russia's military brinkmanship in Europe. Chinese troops did not take part in the most recent edition of Russia's strategic exercises, Zapad-21, which were held in western Russia and Belarus. Instead, Russian troops joined their counterparts in China for a joint exercise, organised far away from Europe. Beijing treads a fine line be- tween targeting individual Eu- ropean states – as with Lith- uania, which was subject to Chinese sanctions such as the removal from the Chinese cus- toms system – and portraying itself as Europe's peaceful part- ner. Open support for Mos- cow's political-military brink- manship in Europe might well push the EU states closer to the US. Even the joint declaration – with its warning about Nato enlargement – is ambivalent on Ukraine. While Russia reaffirms its ad- herence to the One China pol- icy regarding Taiwan, there is no specific mention of Ukraine. Both sides agreed to oppose attempts to undermine securi- ty and stability in their "com- mon adjacent regions", which can only mean central Asia. Positively neutral Russia seems to have moved from a position of studied neu- trality on China's policies in the Asia-Pacific, to outright condemnation of the trilater- al security initiative between Australia, the UK and the United States, "AUKUS" – and Washington's new Indo-Pacific strategy in general. The joint declaration notes that the two countries are se- riously concerned by such de- velopments. Nevertheless, as Moscow struggles to keep India on side, its support for China's policies in south Asia remains limited. Thus, the extent of potential Chinese support for Russia in the face of another round of western sanctions remains un- certain. For now, as one commentator notes "it is enough that China remains positively neutral". Moscow had high hopes for economic assistance after 2014 – but, while Beijing provided some help to Putin and those in his circle, most Chinese companies stayed away, fearing damage to their ties with west- ern markets. Even the new 30-year energy deal can hardly be considered a success for Russia. Building a new gas pipeline to China, Gaz- prom will increase its export to China by 25%, from 38 billion to 48 billion cubic metres a year (BCM). This means central Asia re- mains China's top natural gas supplier, with a pipeline ca- pacity of 55 billion cubic me- tres. Details of the new deal are unavailable, but pricing will be an issue as China is known to drive a hard bargain. It seems unlikely that Mos- cow and Beijing are engaged in a coordinated attempt to pull the US into a two-front war, but keeping this fear alive in the west is valuable in and of itself. Russia and China's growing 'friendship' is more a PR exercise than a new world order Russia's president Vladimir Putin with Chinese leader Xi Jinping