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maltatoday | SUNDAY • 27 FEBRUARY 2022 OPINION 15 Tracey German is Reader in Conflict and Security King's College London RUSSIA'S invasion of Ukraine reveals a change in the approach of the Russian armed forces, as well as an uncompromising po- litical approach. This reflects lessons learnt from military op- erations over two decades and observing others. The Kremlin has used its mili- tary power on a number of occa- sions since 1991 to achieve stra- tegic and foreign policy goals. In the process it has achieved a number of firsts. The 1994-1996 Chechen con- flict was Russia's first post-Soviet war. In 2008, Georgia was Rus- sia's first war of the era against a foreign state. And Syria was portrayed as Russia's first west- ern-style intervention, fought as much as possible at distance, either through the use of long- range precision strike or proxy forces. One of President Vladimir Putin's first priorities on taking power in 2000 was to halt the perceived decline of the Rus- sian armed forces, which have undergone a comprehensive programme of reform and mod- ernisation. There was a clear transformation between the 1994-96 Chechen conflict and Russia's ongoing operations in Syria and Ukraine. Lessons from Georgia The 2008 war with Georgia saw the Russian armed forces fight a conventional war, after years of conflict against insurgents seek- ing independence from Russia in Chechnya and the north Cauca- sus. Despite overwhelming nu- merical superiority and the rapid expulsion of the Georgian armed forces from South Ossetia, Rus- sia's military performance in the 2008 war highlighted some con- tinuing significant weaknesses. These included a lack of pre- cision-guided munitions and an inability to gain air superiority in the area of operations. This led to the conclusion that Russia was still poorly prepared to fight a modern conflict, even against a weaker opponent. In the wake of the war with Georgia, ambitious defence re- form was initiated by former de- fence minister Anatoly Serdyuk- hov. There was considerable investment in modernisation and rearmament. The biggest reform was a ten-year weap- ons-modernisation programme launched in 2010. The aim was to go from only 10% of kit classed as "modern" to 70% by 2020. A particular focus has been on the development of long- range and high-precision weap- ons. Russia believes that such weapons play a decisive role in contemporary conflict, used to target an adversary's critical national infrastructure. Russia demonstrated its new capabil- ities in precision strike in Oc- tober 2015, when it fired Kalibr missile strikes from ships in the Caspian Sea to hit targets over 1,500km away in Syria. The Kremlin has also drawn lessons about how to present its military interventions. Putin has framed the invasion of Ukraine as a "special military operation" to protect civilians from "geno- cide". This is a cynical attempt to portray the invasion as a human- itarian intervention. Moscow took a similar ap- proach in 2008. It maintained that its invasion was intended to stop the alleged genocide of the Ossetian people by Georgian forces, and to protect Russian citizens resident in South Osse- tia. Nato's air campaign against Serbia in 1999 appeared to set a precedent for military action. The alliance circumvented the UN, arguing that its campaign was necessary to halt crimes against humanity that were be- ing conducted by a state within its own borders. Critics argued that humani- tarian intervention was a pre- text for the use of force against a sovereign state. This embold- ened others (including Russia) to follow suit and pursue their own interests under the guise of humanitarian intervention. Moscow did not hesitate to use associated arguments to defend its actions in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. Learning from western re- sponses The Russian intervention in Georgia demonstrated the lengths Moscow was prepared to go to in order to prevent coun- tries in what it considers to be its sphere of influence integrat- ing more closely with the west. Russia's invasion of Georgia al- so demonstrated the apparent weakness of the west, highlight- ing a lack of unity. There was a very limited re- sponse to the invasion and sub- sequent recognition by Russia and a small group of allies of Georgia's breakaway territories, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as independent states. Geor- gia continues to consider them under occupation. This action has clear parallels to that of the breakaway pro-Russian regions in Ukraine. Moscow exploited the lack of consensus amongst western al- lies during its 2014 annexation of Crimea and subsequent sup- port for separatists in eastern Ukraine. Russian involvement was deliberately ambiguous, such as the use of troops in un- marked military uniforms, in or- der to confuse and forestall any international response. The 2008 crisis revealed the limits of western influence with- in Russia's "zone of privileged interest". It also drew attention to the lack of internal unity within organisations such as Na- to over relations with Moscow and future engagement with the area. It could be argued that this emboldened Putin to take action in Ukraine. Part of the problem is Europe's over-reliance on Russia as a sup- plier of natural gas. This has been a long-running issue for European energy security and Europe has long been aware of the dangers. Little progress has been made in reducing dependence on Rus- sian gas since the wake-up call of the 2008 Russian-Georgian war. In 2020 Russian gas giant Gazprom exported 174.9 billion cubic metres (bcm) of gas to Eu- rope. This was down from the record highs of around 200bcm in 2018 and 2019, despite dip- lomatic tensions and the EU's long-running objective to re- duce its dependence on Russia. Revenues from oil and gas ex- ports have enabled Russia to continue investing in its military capabilities. These exports are also a critical vulnerability for a number of European states. Unlike Russia, the west did not learn from 2008. Putin clearly considered western sanctions to be a price worth paying, and calculated that western support for Ukraine would not extend to direct military intervention. Be- cause of this, western warnings about the consequences of a mil- itary invasion have not been tak- en seriously and failed to deter Putin from sending his troops into Ukraine. TheConversation.eu What Russia has learned about Western responses from its past military manoeuvres Tracey German