Issue link: https://maltatoday.uberflip.com/i/1465136
15 maltatoday | WEDNESDAY • 20 APRIL 2022 NEWS UKRAINE CONFLICT THE last big Russian push in the Ukraine war has begun. The Russian army has regrouped af- ter its earlier, uncoordinated as- saults all over Ukraine. It is now concentrating on Donbas, the eastern portion of Ukraine. After its humiliating defeat around Kyiv, this is like- ly Russia's last chance to fight a war of maneuver – to break through Ukrainian lines with its armored columns and wreak havoc in Ukraine's rear. Russia's large commitment of tanks and other armored vehi- cles – and their well-document- ed destruction by Ukrainian soldiers – strongly suggests this is the type of war Russia wants to fight, but which Ukraine has stymied so far. The Course of the War So Far Russian President Vladimir Putin clearly expected a blitz- krieg. Putin seems to have believed his own propaganda that Rus- sian forces would roll over weak defenders weakly com- mitted to a corrupt, semi-fail- ing state with a low sense of national identity. Putin has repeatedly claimed that Ukraine is a 'fake country.' He has been subverting it for a decade. In 2014, he snatched Crimea from it. His likely goal in the war now is to break off another chunk in Donbas as Russia-dependent statelets. The sloppy Russian actions in the first month of the war sug- gest Putin believed this narra- tive, and the result is that Rus- sia squandered the advantages of surprise. Had it been staged and coordinated properly – combined arms failed spectac- ularly – it might have knocked Ukraine out of the war before it could mobilize and before Western aid could make a dif- ference. This failed, and Russia is now fighting a massive proxy war it probably cannot win if it does not win soon. Western aid co- ordination problems will soon be worked out, and NATO heavy weapons are already on their way. Ukraine is a moti- vated, increasingly well-armed opponent. Punishing Western sanctions will gradually un- dercut the Russian economy's ability to support the war ef- fort. The window for a quick Russian victory – which could permit a quick end to the war's losses and a quick end of sanc- tions – is closing. The Donbas offensive is Rus- sia's last chance to wrap this up soon and avoid a long, punish- ing grind. A drawn-out conflict of attrition similar to World War I or the Vietnam War looms, and even if Russia were to somehow win that in a year or two, it would be a pyrrhic victory. Donbas is the Best Area for a Russian Assault Donbas is a good target for a last Russian gamble. The territory is flatter and more open than the urban warfare it tried – and failed at – around Ukraine's cities. Russia's desire to deploy tanks is better suited here. Ukrainian ambush teams will find it hard- er to approach Russian col- umns in open space. The population of Donbas is, ostensibly, sympathetic. East- ern Ukraine has a larger por- tion of Russian-speakers and ethnically Russian people than the rest of Ukraine. It is to defend them against Ukrainian 'Nazis' that Putin launched this war. There are already Russian-sponsored separatists active in Donetsk and Luhansk. If there is any- where in Ukraine where the Russian assault might find local sympathy, it is here. Russian Advantages The unfolding Donbas strug- gle will be the toughest chal- lenge yet for Ukraine. The Russian military has almost certainly learned from its er- rors of the first six weeks. It will probably not make am- ateur mistakes – sending light armored units far in advance unaccompanied, leaving long columns of vehicles lined up for days in easy ambush posi- tion, not informing its soldiers of their actual missions – again. Russian armor should, if properly supported by infantry, be much more devasting than before. The lines of contact in Donbas are long; in some cases, there are trenches. Static, open positions like this are precise- ly what tanks were designed to outmaneuver. If Russian armor can finally move at speed, its tanks should be able to reduce their loss- es to drone strikes. Ukrainian ambush teams will also find it harder to track them and be more exposed to retaliation. And if the Russians really breakthrough, they might en- circle the bulk of the Ukrainian army east of the Dnieper River. Were that to happen, Ukraine would likely sue for peace. The emerging consensus is that if Ukraine does not receive heav- ier weapons from NATO, it will probably lose ground. This likely why Russia resumed its offensive so rapidly after retreating in the north. It needs to outrace the ar- rival of NATO aid. So Russia has a decent chance in this next phase. Its firepow- er will be concentrated on one front. It will likely fight more coher- ently, having learned from last month's bloody nose. NATO heavy weapons will take time to arrive, and pervious Ukraine's advantages – in drones, nimble ambush squads, urban terrain – will matter less this time. But Ukraine survived for the last sixty days when few an- alysts thought it would. It is better led and motivated, and Russia's firepower advantage is eroding if only NATO can ac- celerate its arms transfers. If Ukraine blunt this offensive long enough for those advanced weapons to level the playing field, the war will degenerate into a stalemate. Putin might be tempted to break that with a weapon of mass destruction – but the associated costs of that are massive and unpredictable. Far more likely is that, post-Donbas offensive, the in- vasion becomes a battle of at- trition which Russia loses slow- ly over time. Russia's war for the Donbas begins: what happens if Putin can't win?