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MaltaToday 16 November 2022 MIDWEEK

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8 NEWS maltatoday | WEDNESDAY • 16 NOVEMBER 2022 THE statement signed by Malta alongside Italy, Greece and Cy- prus vaguely backs the Italian position that countries flagging charity ships should take re- sponsibility for the rescued mi- grants stating that "all flag states (should) take responsibility in accordance with their interna- tional obligations." The statement does not explic- itly refer to the Italian refusal to accept 234 migrants left strand- ed at sea for three weeks, on flimsy legal grounds challenged by the European commission, but suggests that Malta, Greece and Cyprus are supporting Italy against France. Just days before the statement the European Commission had insisted on the "immediate disembarkation, at the nearest place of safety, of all persons rescued and who are on board the Ocean Viking," while Ita- ly insisted on these being sent to Norway – 2,000 km north of Rome. Ultimately France accepted to take the migrants in but only after cancelling its commitment to take 3,500 im- migrants which had been pre- viously rescued by Italy. But Malta's support for the Italian position, suggests a change in its diplomatic response to prob- lems created by the Italian far right. Seeking a friend in France Faced with the election of a populist government which took over in Italy in 2018 in which the far-right's Matteo Salvini called the shots on mi- gration, Malta found itself on the receiving end of disputes in which Italy often insisted that Malta was the "nearest port of call" for migrants rescued on the high seas. In this context, Malta had aligned itself with France pro- moting voluntary pacts between member states who were willing to share responsibility for res- cued migrants, in the absence of any long-term mandatory solu- tion obstructed by the Visegrad nations led by Viktor Orban's Hungary, dead set against any obligation to take any migrants from Africa and the Middle East. This alignment also coincid- ed with Joseph Muscat's per- sonal European ambitions at a time when he was still touted for a top EU post just months before his disgraceful exit in December 2019. Fully knowing that his ambitions hinged on his international standing, Muscat abandoned his earlier advoca- cy of push backs, and basked in the company of French Presi- dent Emmanuel Macron, who projected himself as the leader of the liberal camp of 'open so- cieties' against a resurgent hard right. This saw Malta taking mi- grants rescued by NGOs on condition that these are split between EU member states in ad hoc coalitions of willing na- tions which included Spain, France, Ireland and Scandinavi- an countries. Still even back then, Muscat shared Salvini's misgivings on NGOs, with his government impounding a Seawatch ves- sel in 2018 amidst reports that Malta was cooperating with the Libyan coast card in unofficial push backs. Lashing out at res- cue NGOs may well have been part of a balancing act in a bid to appease Labour's own an- ti-immigrant voters. Since his election as Labour leader, Abe- la has gone even further in ap- peasing these voters, repeatedly insisting that Malta is 'full up'. The end of the Franco-Italian entente? But following the appointment of a technocratic government led by Mario Draghi, tensions between Italy and the EU over migration were defused as the new PM banked on aligning Italian foreign and econom- ic policy with France in a bid to create a southern European alliance to strengthen the eco- nomic and political clout of his country in the context of uncer- tainties caused by the pandemic and the war in Ukraine. In short, under Draghi, com- mon economic and political interests eclipsed migration concerns. This diplomatic ap- proach did pay off in the shape of a voluntary solidarity mech- anism approved in June aimed at easing the pressure on front- line countries such as Greece, Italy and Spain in the absence of a still elusive mandatory migra- tion pact. This went some way to enshrining previous ad hoc agreements forged in response to crisis situation but fell short of the relocation model which was so effective in addressing the refugee crisis created by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Yet this may well have come at a political cost. For immigration concerns pumped up by misin- formation galvanised the Italian far right in its electoral victory in September. Faced now by the election of Giorgia Meloni as Italy's most right-wing prime minister since the second world war, Malta understandably seems bent on Malta's migration diplomacy: From hobnobbing On Saturday Malta joined Italy, Cyprus and Greece in a statement lamenting the lack of a mandatory solidarity mechanism for the relocation of migrants in Europe while lashing at NGO boats saving migrants on the high seas. But overshadowing this diplomatic initiative were the escalating tensions between the EU's two major Mediterranean powers, Italy and France. So what does Malta stand to gain by allying itself with an Italian far- right government, which is still on probation, in a stand-off with France? Asks James Debono

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