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OPINION Marcin Kaczmarski is Lecturer in Security Studies, University of Glasgow 12 maltatoday | WEDNESDAY • 24 MAY 2023 FOR more than three decades, Moscow and Beijing have been incrementally strengthening their partnership. The growing number of potentially conflict- ing interests, for instance over investment and exploration in the Arctic, have not slowed down cooperation. Despite Russia becoming Chi- na's "junior partner" over the last decade as Beijing's eco- nomic and global strength has grown, their relationship re- mains strong. Pushing back against US power is a continual driver for both nations. But if Russian president Vladimir Putin was no longer in a leadership role would the re- lationship unravel? A change of leadership in Moscow is likely to complicate Russian-Chinese cooperation, but not due to ide- ological shifts in Russian poli- tics or geopolitical realignments on the global scene. The prospects for Russia's democratisation or improve- ment in relations with the west are the bleakest in the last two decades. It is Russian domestic politics that is most likely to play a significant role in affect- ing the direction of the future relationship of the two coun- tries. Any change in the Kremlin is likely to upset a delicate bal- ance in Russia's political and economic ecosystem and would lead to a new round of internal struggles for influence and re- sources. While deepening coopera- tion with Beijing, Moscow has signed a number of agreements, which were sub-optimal from the perspective of the Russian state but which strengthened the positions of Putin's allies and associates. In return, they created a pow- erful pro-Chinese lobby in the corridors of the Kremlin. With- out Putin's patronage, these business empires could be tar- geted by those surrounding a new leader, if they wanted to move into having more diverse business partners abroad. What's more, those Russians who have supported ever closer cooperation with China cannot be taken for granted. If China decided to employ wolf-warri- or diplomacy (a confrontation- al technique that pushes back against criticism of the Beijing government) in Russia it could alienate those who were previ- ously allies. Some Russian scholars warned of this even before the war in Ukraine. An escalation of Chi- nese cyber, industrial and tra- ditional espionage practices – a temptation that may be irresist- ible for a stronger partner – would push Russian intelligence services to crack down on Chi- nese technology with possible surveillance capabilities. A new leader would have an opportunity to reassess the de- gree of Russia's dependence on China and the broader context of Russian policy in Asia. It is worth remembering that al- ready in the mid-2000s, Russia was trying to make a "turn to the east", not a turn to China. Russia's Asian policy was to be balanced and diversified, focused on cooperation with China, Japan, Korean states and south-east Asian countries. Oil and gas pipelines were meant to serve Asian customers, not just China. Meanwhile, China has been buying the lion's share of the oil sent to Russia's Asian terminal in Kozmino. The Power of Sibe- ria gas pipeline and its potential second branch go only to China and thus make it impossible for Russia to start exporting gas di- rectly to other customers such as South Korea. The participation of Russian aircraft and ships in joint pa- trols around Japan is beneficial to Beijing, but it limits Moscow's room for manoeuvre to forge other Asian allies and makes it dependent on Chinese policy. Domestic opinion Domestic politics in Russia has created favourable condi- tions for close cooperation with China. But regime survival con- siderations affect the Kremlin's assessment of China's growing power and lead it to neglect the growing asymmetry in relations with Beijing. The Russian elite does not see China as a threat to the secu- rity and survival of the regime. Therefore, it is easier for Mos- cow to interpret China's rise to a superpower as friendly and to accept its growing global role, even if it makes Russia a less significant partner. The financial and political benefits gained from the part- nership by individual members of the Russian elite have been another driver for the relation- ship with Beijing. Not everyone is as enthusiastic about coop- eration as Igor Sechin, head of state-owned oil firm Rosneft, for whom China is the most im- portant partner. However, even those compa- nies who compete with their Chinese counterparts, such as Russia's state nuclear energy corporation Rosatom, still ben- efit from having a presence on the Chinese market. Without a doubt, a new Rus- sian leader's hands would be tied to a large extent. Oil and gas pipelines leading to Chi- na connect Russian companies with this market and cannot be replaced easily. The selective support offered by China has consolidated the pro-Beijing orientation of the key players in Russia. Even before the war in Ukraine, Beijing helped some companies circumvent the barriers from western sanctions by offering prepayments for oil deliveries or providing loans. A large part of the Russian elite sees China as the only partner against the west. Nevertheless, any new lead- er will have an opportunity to re-evaluate the costs and ben- efits of close ties with Beijing, and it will be in their interest to do so, if it can strengthen its hand. How Russia might rethink its alliance with China after Putin Marcin Kaczmarski Chinese President Xi Jinping (left) and Russian President Vladimir Putin (right) signed a new agreement at the Kremlin in Moscow in March, cementing their 'no limits' partnership, days after Putin was issued an international arrest warrant