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11 WORLD 1.6.2023 Chinese President Xi Jinping, Kazakhstan's President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kyrgyzstan's President Sadyr Japarov, Tajikistan's President Emomali Rahmon, Turkmenistan's President Serdar Berdymukhamedov and Uzbekistan's President Shavkat Mirziyoyev pose for pictures during the China-Central Asia Summit in Xian, China on May 19, 2023 ON May 18, Chinese President Xi Jinping held a lavish ceremony in the ornate Tang Paradise theme park in Xian, the heart of the ancient Silk Road, for five visiting Central Asian presidents who had arrived for the in- augural China-Central Asia summit. Conspicuously, the summit took place at the same time as the G7 meeting of wealthy nations in Hiroshima. Com- menting on the two summits, China's state-run Global Times claimed that the "G7 speaks the language of an out- moded Cold War mentality" while the Xian summit focused on the "promo- tion of cooperation and inclusiveness". In his welcoming remarks, Xi hailed the summit as signalling "a new era of China-Central Asia relations". Xi said that "China is ready to help Central Asian countries strengthen capacity building on law enforcement, security and defence in an effort to safeguard peace in the region". The summit re- sulted in a string of economic agree- ments signalling that China is again open for business after two years of COVID-19 border restrictions. While China consolidates its hegem- ony in Eurasia, it is also promoting a viable competitive vision to the cur- rent United States-led order. Yet it is presenting itself as an alternative leader not just to the US, but also to Russia, which it aims to gradually dis- place from Central Asia. An uneasy partnership China has grown into the largest economic actor in Central Asia. To- tal Chinese investments in the region ballooned from $40bn in 2020, to over $70bn by the end of 2022. Rus- sia, which accounted for 80 percent of the region's trade in the 1990s, now accounts for less than two-thirds of Beijing's trade. Lurking beneath these big numbers is a growing asymmetry between Chi- na and Central Asia. In 2020, an es- timated 45 percent of Kyrgyzstan's external debt, and 52 percent of Tajik- istan's was owed to China. Meanwhile, 75 percent of Turkmeni- stan's exports depend on Chinese con- sumers. The growing debt burdens have been linked to high-level cor- ruption scandals and have resulted in political instability, also undermining Beijing's credibility. Indeed, Sinophobia has become rel- atively widespread in Central Asia, particularly in Kazakhstan and Kyr- gyzstan. According to survey data, 30 percent of Kazakhs and 35 percent of Kyrgyz have a negative view of China. Protests against China's rising role in the region, perceived by some as taking jobs from locals, polluting the environment, and part of a broader strategy to "colonise" the region, have been on the rise. According to our data, 241 protests related to China took place in Kazakhstan from Janu- ary 1, 2018 to June 30, 2021, although more than half were related to an on- going protest by relatives of those de- tained in Xinjiang's camps. Some of these protests have turned violent. After the Kyrgyz government was ousted in October 2020 follow- ing flawed elections, about 300 locals stormed the Ishtamberdi mine operat- ed by China's Full Gold Mining, chas- ing off 132 Chinese workers who were forced to spend the night in a snowy forest. A mob of 100 people also barri- caded a group of 35 Chinese business- men within their hotel in Bishkek. Amid the growing backlash to Chi- na's extreme policies in Xinjiang to- wards Uighurs and ethnic Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, and the wider Sinopho- bia in the region, Beijing has solicited support for its policies from Central Asian governments. While Kyrgyzstan offered a state- ment of support in June 2019, it de- clined, along with Kazakhstan, to sign a letter to the United Nations back- ing Beijing's position the following month. But in October 2022, Uzbek- istan and Kazakhstan voted to block a UN investigation into China's human rights abuses in Xinjiang. The issue was also notably absent from the talks in Xian last month. Out of Russia's shadow In the first two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, China opted to primarily interact with Central Asia through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which also includes Russia as a mem- ber. But the Xi Jinping era has seen China increasingly creating its own mechanisms to work with its western neighbours. The Xian summit, hosted by China + C5, a multilateral frame- work excluding Russia, is a dramatic example of Beijing's increasingly inde- pendent course in the region. While China and Russia proclaimed a "no limits" partnership in February 2022 and have pledged to work to- gether to prevent what they call "col- our revolutions" and external interfer- ence in the affairs of Central Asia, it is clear that Beijing seeks to displace Russia in its former empire. Beginning with Xi's announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in an October 2013 speech in Kazakh- stan, Central Asia's engagements with China have in many ways stood at the centre of Beijing's policy of increased global assertiveness that its media re- fer to as the "New Era". Over the past year, China has an- nounced a trio of new policies — the Global Security Initiative, Global Civilization Initiative and the Global Development Initiative — which col- lectively aim to present an alterna- tive model of international relations to Western liberal norms. The Glob- al Security Initiative, for instance, is Beijing's pushback against alliances like NATO, with China arguing that the West is trapped in a "Cold War mentality". While Moscow remains Central Asia's dominant arms provider, ac- counting for about 50 percent of all transfers, China's share of arms im- ports to the region has increased from 1.5 percent in 2010 to 13 percent to- day. Since 2016, China has been qui- etly building a network of military fa- cilities along the Tajik-Afghan border. A new era In Hiroshima, G7 leaders talked of the need to "reduce critical depend- encies" on China. Europe has also been growing more critical of China, with a recent internal memo calling on European Union member states to "prepare" for a crisis over Taiwan and "de-risk" its dependence on Beijing. But meanwhile, the Xian summit helped China shore up political sup- port for the "reunification" of Taiwan with China and for infrastructure development that would diversify Beijing's energy sources away from Western ports and sea routes in case of international conflict. All at Russia's cost, too. Amid its focus on the war in Ukraine, Russia has reportedly weakened its 201st Military Base which as of 2021 had an estimated 7,000 troops sta- tioned at three facilities in Tajikistan. In April, the Ukrainian army claimed it had destroyed a column of the 4th Battalion Tactical Group from this base. Multiple sources have confirmed that over 2,000 troops, in addition to at least 30 tanks, have been redeployed to Ukraine. At least 500 soldiers have been redeployed from Russia's base in Kant, Kyrgyzstan. The Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) mili- tary alliance has also proved largely ineffective in resolving either violent territorial disputes between member states Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, or in bolstering member Armenia in its tensions with fellow post-Soviet state Azerbaijan. This has seriously under- mined Russia's commitments to its allies. Against that backdrop, the gather- ing in Xian had tremendous symbolic value. It signalled that China is posi- tioning itself as a partner of choice for Central Asia that can offer the region what Russia can't. Russia faces a new neighbourhood threat: China

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