Issue link: https://maltatoday.uberflip.com/i/1502308
15 WORLD maltatoday | WEDNESDAY • 28 JUNE 2023 ONE of the most shocking as- pects of the weekend's mutiny by Yevgeny Prigozhin's Wagner pri- vate military company is that the Russian armed forces appear to have done next to nothing to stop the Wagner troops as they moved first from field camps in Ukraine to the southern Russian city of Rostov-on-Don, where they seized key military headquarters, and then on almost to Moscow. In theory, those headquarters— as the main command center for Russia's operations in Ukraine— should have been one of the most high-security sites in the country. Yet Prigozhin was able to breeze in with his gang of mercenaries in tow and effectively take two sen- ior generals hostage: First Deputy Head of the General Staff Main Directorate Vladimir Alekseyev and Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov. Even after a criminal case was initiated against Prigozhin on suspicion of inciting armed in- surrection and Putin addressed the nation, calling Prigozhin's actions a "stab in the back," there was still no resistance. It seems that the maverick Wagner boss may not be mistaken in his belief that there are plenty of people within the armed forces and se- curity services who secretly sym- pathize with his cause. In his voice notes explaining the mutiny, Prigozhin clearly stat- ed that he was going to "have it out with [Defense Minister Ser- gei] Shoigu," not taking a stand against the armed forces. On the contrary, he said that his "march for justice" was also being carried out in their name. The Russian armed forces are not monolithic, but consist of a multitude of rival groups com- peting for positions and sources of income. Far from everyone within the military leadership is loyal to Shoigu and Gener- al Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov personally: as a rule, that's only those who have been promoted through the ranks with their help, or who have been awarded lu- crative Defense Ministry–linked contracts. In recent months, Prigozhin has been trying to win over another group of gener- als: those whose careers took off under the reformist respective predecessors of Shoigu and Ger- asimov—Anatoly Serdyukov and Nikolai Makarov—and stalled af- ter their departure. Long before the mutiny, Prigozhin had said openly that he would like to see Shoigu replaced with Mikhail Mizintsev, and Ger- asimov with Sergei Surovikin. Mizintsev, dubbed the "Butcher of Mariupol" by Western media for his supervision of the devas- tating siege of the Ukrainian city, was one of the most promising generals during the Serdyuk- ov-Makarov military reforms in 2008–2012. In 2012, he was made head of the Central Command Post of the General Staff, an of- fice that had just been established in order to streamline the archaic chain of command in the Russian armed forces. Shoigu, who was appointed defense minister soon after, pre- served the new institution and Mizintsev at its head, but never favored the general. After taking Mariupol, Mizintsev was first demoted and then apparently discharged from the army, af- ter which he became a deputy commander of Wagner. There is no doubt that Mizintsev has re- tained his influence among those officers who rose up through the ranks under his command, and it's possible that Mizintsev's reputation among those officers played a role in Wagner's abili- ty to occupy the Rostov military headquarters without any blood- shed. Surovikin also prospered under the Serdyukov-Makarov leader- ship. Back then, he was appoint- ed head of another newly created institution: the military police. As in Mizintsev's case, Shoigu confirmed the appointment, but limited the powers of the new establishment. Still, Surovikin managed to build a strong rep- utation—first in Syria and then as the commander of operations in Ukraine last October—before being replaced with Gerasimov in January. Prigozhin and his war blogger followers have frequently praised Surovikin, who remains a key figure within the top brass who is not part of Shoigu and Gerasimov's inner circle. Of all those in the military leadership, Surovikin enjoys the most au- thority among rank-and-file of- ficers. The examples of Mizintsev and Surovikin confirm that the main group that Prigozhin was count- ing on to remain neutral or offer silent support was senior officers who made their careers under the reforms enacted by Serdyu- kov and Makarov. Interestingly, the establishment of Wagner and Prigozhin's appointment as its head also date back to this time. Under those reforms, 80 per- cent of colonels and 70 percent of majors were discharged from the armed forces, creating plenty of opportunities for more junior officers to rise up through the ranks. These (now senior) officers do not owe their careers to Shoigu or Gerasimov, and may be more inclined to agree with Prigozhin's criticism of the military leader- ship in the belief that if Shoigu had continued those reforms, the Russian armed forces would be performing better in Ukraine. While the officers are not pre- pared to express their frustration openly, when speaking anony- mously they are vocal in their criticism of both the Defense Ministry and Putin. Following the failure of his mu- tiny, it's unlikely Prigozhin will get his wish of Mizintsev being appointed defense minister. But he may be satisfied with Alexei Dyumin, a former military intel- ligence officer, Putin bodyguard, and deputy defense minister who was put in charge of the Defense Ministry's Special Operations Forces in 2014. This is the elite division credit- ed in Russia for the successful an- nexation of Crimea in the spring of 2014. Since 2016, Dyumin has been the governor of the Tu- la region, home to key defense industry enterprises. His name frequently features in discussions about potential successors to Pu- tin. In interviews, Prigozhin has been effusive in his praise of Dyumin's command of the an- nexation operation. The Insider has reported that the two men share some business interests, and last fall Meduza cited sourc- es as saying that Dyumin had his own reasons to criticize the De- fense Ministry under his former boss Shoigu, since the two men had apparently not gotten on, re- sulting in Dyumin being posted to Tula. Dyumin did not join the many other regional governors rallying around the Kremlin on June 24 with public expressions of sup- port for the president and con- demnation of Prigozhin. Then, shortly after the news broke that Prigozhin had agreed to stand down, apparently under the terms of a deal brokered by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, it was reported that it was in fact Dyumin who had negotiated terms with Prigozhin. The governor's press service was quick to deny the reports, but Pu- tin's spokesman declined to com- ment on the rumor. Taking all of the above into account, it's entirely possible that by the start of his "march for justice," Prigozhin believed he would find solidarity among many officers in the armed forc- es, and that if his uprising was successful, they would be joined by certain groups within the rul- ing elite, such as generals with no direct ties to Shoigu, or former members of Putin's security de- tail seeking to boost their status within the system. Prigozhin wasn't wrong on the first count, and most of the armed forces made no attempt to stop him advancing on Moscow. But his hopes for support from elite groups who would also like to see a Defense Ministry reshuffle ap- pear to have been dashed. Putin threw his unequivocal backing behind the armed forces, cutting off any ways for other bodies of authority to express solidarity with Wagner. Still, Prigozhin's mutiny re- vealed the scale of the crisis within the Russian armed forces, which are disillusioned by con- stant failures and tired of war, and within the military and secu- rity elites more broadly. When senior and mid-ranking officers effectively respond to an armed mutiny with a "go slow" strike, there can be little doubt that the Wagner boss will not be the last challenger to square off against Shoigu and his allies and seek to capitalize on the un- spoken but growing resentment within the Russian armed forces. Who was Prigozhin counting on to back his failed mutiny? Mercenary boss Yevgeny Prigozhin