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OPINION Simon J Smith is Associate Professor of Security and International Relations, Staffordshire University Jordan Becker is Director, SOSH Research Lab Assistant Professor of International Affairs, US Military Academy West Point 12 maltatoday | WEDNESDAY • 19 JULY 2023 IN a surprise move, Turkey has ended its veto on Sweden joining Nato, thereby removing all the barriers to its membership of the military alliance. Hungary quickly followed suit and, as a result of the two coun- tries' support, a consensus was able to be reached at the 2023 Nato summit in Vilnius, Lithu- ania. Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan agreeing to sup- port Sweden's bid to join will be touted as one of the key achieve- ments of the summit. Sweden submitted its formal application for membership in May 2022 alongside Finland, which was admitted into the alli- ance in April 2023. Sweden, though not a formal member, has had a very close relationship with Nato for al- most 30 years, since joining the alliance's Partnership for Peace programme in 1994. It has con- tributed to Nato missions. And as a member of the European Un- ion and contributor to the bloc's common security and defence policy, it has also worked closely with the vast majority of Europe- an Nato allies. In pursuing Nato member- ship, both Sweden and Finland have dramatically shifted their traditional policy of military non-alignment. A critical driver of this move was, clearly, Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. It is also more evidence that Russian president Vladimir Putin has failed to achieve two of his own strategic objectives: weaken- ing solidarity in the alliance and preventing further Nato enlarge- ment towards Russia's borders. Finland and Sweden's accession is of significant operational im- portance to how Nato defends allied territory against Russian aggression. Integrating these two nations on its north flank (the At- lantic and European Arctic) will help to solidify plans for defend- ing its Ukraine-adjacent centre (from the Baltic Sea to the Alps). This will ensure that Russia has to contend with powerful and inter- operable military forces across its entire western border. Why Turkey lifted its veto For a few years now, Turkey's relationship with Nato has been nuanced and strained. Turkey's objections to Sweden's accession were ostensibly connected to its concerns over Sweden's policy towards the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK. Turkey has accused Sweden of hosting Kurdish militants. Nato has acknowledged this as a legit- imate security concern and Swe- den has made concessions as part of its journey towards Nato. The main material driver of the agreement, however, may always have been a carrot being dangled by the US. American president Joe Biden now appears to be moving for- ward with plans to transfer F-16 fighter jets to Turkey – a deal that appears to have been unlocked by Erdoğan's changed stance on Sweden. But it is often the case that a host of surrounding deals and suggestions of deals can help facilitate movement at Nato. Everyone, including Turkey, now seems able to sell the develop- ments as a win to their constitu- ents back home. The 'Nordic round' Sweden's accession means all Nordic nations are now part of Nato. As well as being significant in operational and military terms, this enlargement has major po- litical, strategic and defence planning implications. Although Finland and Sweden have been "virtual allies" for years, their formal accession means some changes in practice. Strategically, the two are now free to work seamlessly with the rest of the Nato allies to plan for collective defence. Integrating strategic plans is extremely val- uable, particularly considering Finland's massive border with Russia and Sweden's possession of critical terrain like the Baltic Sea island of Gotland. This will increase strategic interoperability and coordination. Nato allies also open their de- fence planning books to one an- other in unprecedented ways. Finland and Sweden will now undergo bilateral (with Nato's in- ternational secretariat) and mul- tilateral (with all allies) examina- tions as part of the Nato defence planning process. They will also contribute to the strategic decisions that undergird that process. Their defence investments will also be scrutinised (and they will scrutinise the spending of other allies). Initial analysis suggests that while Finland and Sweden have lagged behind their Nor- dic neighbours' increases in de- fence investment since 2014. Finland's investment in defence leapt significantly leading up to and following its accession to Nato. While we may not know for months if the same is true of Sweden, we may expect similar increases on its part. Alliance norms and peer pressure are powerful. The expansion of Nato to in- clude Sweden is a major step for all these reasons. But while any- one watching the Vilnius sum- mit will naturally now be asking whether the shift changes the sit- uation for Ukraine's membership aspirations, an answer is unlikely to be on the near horizon. Any final decision on Ukraine being offered a membership action plan for the time being is a bridge too far, especially in the current context of an ongoing war with an outcome that, as yet, is unpre- dictable. Sweden is joining Nato: what that means for the alliance and the war in Ukraine Simon J. Smith & Jordan Becker Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan with the Secretary General of NATO Jens Stoltenberg and Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson