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15 maltatoday | WEDNESDAY • 9 AUGUST 2023 WORLD they've done that," said Simon Schlegel, senior Ukraine analyst at the Interna- tional Crisis Group. Still, Russia has not solved all of its logistical and equipment constraints, especially when it comes to artillery. Troops are plagued by low morale, and some are poorly trained. Ukraine can still exploit all of these. But as a West- ern intelligence official said at a briefing in late July, "The ability of the Russians just to grit it out should not be underes- timated." Ukraine hasn't been able to master combined arms warfare at scale Billions in Western military donations have helped transform Ukraine into a formidable military. It has advanced bat- tle tanks and a cadres of NATO-trained troops. All of this was supposed to give Ukraine an edge in its counteroffensive. And in some ways, it has. But it's com- plicated. Ukraine's newly trained troops were also untested and inexperienced in bat- tle when the counteroffensive began. And even with all this Western equip- ment and training, Ukraine has strug- gled to conduct combined arms opera- tions – that is, using all of its military systems and platforms together on a large scale. In the early days of the counterof- fensive, Ukrainian forces attempted to break through Russian lines with mech- anised combined arms formations, but these were largely repulsed by Russia because of its deep defenses. Ukraine suffered heavy casualties as a result. American and European officials said some 20 percent of Western equipment was destroyed or damaged in battle in the opening weeks of the counteroffen- sive. Not a lot of armies can successfully pull off a fluid, mechanized offense — let alone one compiled and trained in a matter of months, and against an army like Russia's. This is a big reason why Ukraine has shifted its battlefield tac- tics, focused instead on wearing Russia down rather than trying to blitz through enemy lines. Kyiv faces additional logistical and supply challenges. It needs advanced weapons, but it also needs tools like de-mining and engineering equipment. Ukrainian troops have said they need more of these tools, and Russia is re- portedly targeting such equipment in strikes. Ukraine is burning through a lot of ammunition, and it is relying on a lot of different munitions from a lot of dif- ferent countries. These systems work together, but imperfectly; artillery may fire, but it might not travel as far or be as accurate. But Ukraine often has no choice but to use what's available, when it's available — even if it complicates offensive operations. These are not necessarily new difficulties for Ukrain- ian forces, but they're amplified given Ukraine's ambition for this counterof- fensive. Ukraine enters the next phase of its counteroffensive. What now? Ukraine is currently fighting on three axes — two in the south and one in the east, near Bakhmut. The retaking of Staromaiorske represented pro- gress along one very critical axis in the Ukrainian push south, where Kyiv seeks to reach the Sea of Azov, with the goal of slicing up Russian-controlled ter- ritory. The military balance of power has yet not shifted in this region. But Staromaiorsk was a sign, at least, that Ukraine could turn things around in this next phase of the counteroffensive. "We may reach a point where Ukraine really can start to attack first the first line of defenses, and the strongest one, built by Russia," Borsari said. "So far, most of the clashes and most of the at- tacks have been in an area that is like a gray zone; it's not even the first line of defense by Russia." To achieve this, Ukraine is pursuing a more creeping advance, seeking to weaken and wear down Russian troops. It is doing this by targeting critical Russian components, like artillery and supply lines and transportation infra- structure. This helps Ukraine preserve manpower and equipment, but it costs a lot more in artillery and in time, with- out a lot of change in territory. "To some extent, I would say that is the trade-off that Ukraine is plagued with," Masuhr said. Manpower is one of the big questions around Ukraine's capabilities right now. Kyiv kept thousands of newly trained troops in reserves, but in recent weeks it has started at least sending some of those into battle. This may signal a more intense push by Ukraine, but it carries risks, too: The more reserves Ukraine commits, the fewer fresh troops it will have available to rotate out, or to re- spond to any shifts on the battlefield. Artillery and ammunition are also key to Ukraine's current strategy, and Ukraine will need a lot of it. Last month, the United States made the controver- sial decision to send cluster munitions, which was at least partially an attempt to help over tide the Ukrainians as the US and Europe ramp up artillery pro- duction. Those efforts are already un- derway. And then there's the time factor. Ukraine's strategy of attrition may be effective, but after the counteroffen- sive's early stumbles, it has a lot less time to wear Russia down. Autumn 2023 is not an official dead- line, exactly, but it is likely going to be the time frame by which a lot of West- ern governments will judge Ukraine's success or failure. The front lines hav- en't changed substantially since Ukraine forced a Russian retreat in Kherson in November 2022. If the boundaries re- main largely frozen for more than a year, a decisive victory for either side will start looking less and less likely. That is not a foregone conclusion, and Ukraine can still succeed. And if it does, the slow, grinding counteroffensive may all of a sudden look very, very different. "It's like bankruptcy — very slowly, and then all at once," Bury said. "There could come a point where they wear down the Russians enough for them to break through somewhere, and then, out in the open, drive those Western tanks. But so far, we've not really seen it getting to that point." counteroffensive Soldiers of the 128th Brigade of Ukraines Territorial Defense force walk across a field beside a camouflaged vehicle after they receive training to counter Russian mines that litter Russia's built-up defense lines in the Zaporizhzhia region