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15 maltatoday | WEDNESDAY • 23 AUGUST 2023 WORLD contravention of the principle of non-dis- crimination and equality for all states under Article I of the OST. Several states have since made attempts to advance space security governance. In 2008, China and Russia introduced a draft treaty on the prevention of placement of weapons in outer space (PPWT), which was later amended and resubmitted for consideration in 2014. The EU had also led an initiative for a Code of Conduct on Out- er Space Activities, which collapsed in ne- gotiations in 2015. In addition, UN Groups of Governmental Experts (GGE) have been convened to discuss specific topics, includ- ing the adoption by consensus of transpar- ency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities in 2013, and the GGE convened in 2018 and 2019 on fur- ther practical measures for PAROS, which failed to reach consensus. Discussions on space security were re- invigorated as the subject of the UN Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) initiated by the United Kingdom, on reduc- ing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviour in 2021. Established by UNGA resolution 76/231, the OEWG convenes four times over 2022 and 2023, with the final session starting next week aiming for recommendations to be adopted by consensus. Furthermore, a new GGE, established by UNGA resolution 77/250, initiated by the Russian Federation, will convene in 2023 and 2024, aiming to make recommendations by consensus on substantial elements of an international legally binding instrument on PAROS, in- cluding, inter alia, on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space. Nota- bly, the format of the GGE is distinguished from the OEWG; whereas the OEWG fa- cilitates inclusivity by inviting participation of all states as well as international and civil society organizations, industry and aca- demia, the membership of the GGE will be restricted to 25 states only – including five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council and the rest based on geographical representation. In all these fora, states, international and civil society organizations, and other actors have consistently emphasized the need to avoid conflict in space, as it would have devastating consequences for all. While this is certainly accurate, ensuring that such an outcome is prevented will re- quire further measures. Whether military uses of space occur during peacetime, or conflict, there are risks to civilian uses of space systems. The following steps are therefore proposed as a starting point to develop policy measures that limit the hu- man costs of military operations in or in relation to outer space. Identify gaps and establish common un- derstanding of existing international law The use of space systems is governed by international space treaties and other ap- plicable international law. However, while dynamics of the global space sector have evolved rapidly, multilateral progress on space security has been slow, leaving gaps to be addressed. These gaps are not limited to international space law, but also other bodies of applicable international law. Within space law, this is evident from the need for shared interpretation and com- mon understanding in certain provisions of the space treaties, evidenced even dur- ing recent discussions at the OEWG. For instance, some states referred to the use of space for 'exclusively peaceful purpos- es' even though this term is used strictly in relation to the moon and other celestial bodies (and not outer space in general) under Article IV of the OST. This implies that some may misinterpret this provision as extending the principle of 'exclusively peaceful purposes' to all of outer space. Similarly, there is no clarity on Article IX of the OST, which has an obligation for states to engage in 'international consul- tations' if it has reason to believe that an activity would cause potentially harmful interference. Since this wording is sub- jective, there is a need for shared under- standing on what constitutes 'potentially harmful interference', and further, what amounts to a 'consultation'. Furthermore, shared understanding on how other relevant international laws ap- ply to outer space, including their interplay with space law, is lacking. IHL applies to outer space during armed conflict. This has been reaffirmed by many states (for example, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Phil- ippines, South Africa and the member states of the EU during recent discussions at the OEWG, and in UNGA resolution 77/41). The ICRC has also identified spe- cific rules of IHL that are relevant to out- er space. However, the space domain has unique physical characteristics, and space systems used by civilians vary. There are additionally different means of attacking or disrupting these systems. In the event of armed conflict, interpreting and applying such rules to space will be essential to min- imize impacts on civilians. Yet so far there has been very limited publication of na- tional positions on how IHL applies to out- er space. States are therefore encouraged to opine on this, with a view to ensuring the protection afforded by IHL to civilians against the effects of military operations in relation to outer space. This will also in- fluence the assessment of whether the ex- isting rules are adequate or whether new rules may be needed. Identifying each of these gaps, and then establishing a common understanding of existing international law, are the first steps towards limiting human costs of mil- itary space operations both during peace- time and conflict. Propose recommendations building on the existing space governance frame- work An analysis of existing provisions under each of the space treaties indicates which may be useful as a basis for future policy measures dedicated to the protection of ci- vilians. There are a number of mechanisms that can be built based on the existing nor- mative and legal framework. For instance, policy measures on how to enhance infor- mation-sharing based on the obligation for states to share information on the 'nature, conduct, locations and results' of space activities under Article XI of the Outer Space Treaty. This provision can facilitate the creation of a database that exhibits the extent of civilian dependency on various space systems. Similarly, registration can be explored as a vehicle for the protection of space systems on which essential civilian services rely. Analyzing current practice of states under the Registration Convention could help determine how much voluntary information needs to be shared when pro- viding registration notifications and how to further update the general function of a satellite as required by the Convention. As proposed by the ICRC in its preliminary recommendations to the OEWG, regis- tration under the Convention of the pro- tected status of those space-based critical civilian systems can help ensure that they are protected during armed conflicts. In this manner, a comprehensive study of all existing legal and normative provisions of space governance can be conducted with the objective of building policy meas- ures that enhance the protection of civil- ians and critical civilian infrastructure. Centre the protection of civilians in dis- cussions on space security Recent exchanges at international fora, including the OEWG, exhibit that states are increasingly acknowledging the im- portance of space systems to civilians and the need to protect critical infrastructure. Multiple statements by international and civil society organizations further under- scored these perspectives. Notably, the ICRC provided an overview of the types of space systems considered necessary for the provision of essential civilian services and for the protection and functioning of persons and objects specifically protected under international law. Accordingly, states should center the pro- tection of space-based systems critical for civilians and civilian infrastructure in future multilateral discussions on space security, including by setting the relevant agenda item on the subject, and by clearly linking this to their statements regarding conflict prevention. Doing so will highlight the im- portance of protecting space systems essen- tial for civilian use in space security fora. In this connection, one useful tool as a baseline for such discussions could be sce- nario-mapping. This refers to mapping sce- narios of which space systems are essential to civilians, the extent of potential civilian impacts in case of their disruption, dam- age or destruction, and how these can be protected by rules of existing international law, including IHL. It can help inform how to limit the potential human costs arising from military space operations, particular- ly with regard to space systems necessary for essential civilian services. Collectively, these steps can help prior- itize the protection of civilians in space security discussions, and spark movement towards policy measures that limit the hu- man costs of military operations in space. steps to limit the human outer space