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The European Parliament can also not be held liable for direct or indirect damage that may result from the implementation of the action. 11 EWROPEJ 2024 maltatoday | SUNDAY • 11 FEBRUARY 2024 elections to deliver gains to far-right groups together to account for 25 per cent of MEPs, and have more seats combined than the EPP or the S&D for the first time." It will be in Italy that the ECR will pick most seats, as a result of Brothers of Italy (FdI), emerging as one of the largest delegations with 27 seats. With the expected fall of Forza Italia to only 7 seats, though, the EPP may approach Brothers of Italy to join their group. On the other hand, the ECR could lose seats in Poland, and gain most seats in Romania and Spain, in addition to Italy. ID will however lose many seats in Italy, with the decline of Lega, but these losses will be offset by significant gains in France, Germany, the Nether- lands, Poland, Portugal, Bulgar- ia, and Austria. And with the Greens losing mainly in Germany, France, and Italy, the opposite will happen for the Left. "Naturally, there is some uncertainty in these predictions. In addition to the inevitable un- certainty of current opinion polls and our forecast of the likely vote shares and seats for each nation- al party, there is also uncertainty regarding which political groups some parties will eventually join," the ECFR said. Coalition patterns These changes will affect the sizes of the potential coalitions between the political groups in the chamber. The "grand coa- lition" of the EPP and the S&D, which lost a majority in the par- liament for the first time in 2019, is set to lose seats, holding 42 per cent of the total, compared to its current 45 per cent. Even with the RE group, the "su- per grand coalition" of the three centrist groups will only hold 54 per cent of the seats, compared to its current 60 per cent. With the average level of voting cohesion within groups in the European Parliament – which means that each group cannot always guar- antee all their MEPs will follow the group voting instructions – 54 per cent of the seats might not be enough for these three groups to guarantee a winning majority when they vote together. The left-right balance in the parliament will shift dramatically to the right. The left coalition – of the S&D, the G/EFA, and the Left – will lose seats, with 33 per cent of the total, compared to the current 35 per cent. And, even if the left coalition can secure the support of RE – which they have done on environmental and so- cial rights issues during the cur- rent term – it would hold only 45 per cent of the seats, compared to 50 per cent in the current parlia- ment. By contrast, the size of the co- alitions on the right is set to in- crease. A centre-right coalition – of the EPP, RE, and the ECR – will likely lose some seats, holding 48 per cent instead of the current 49 per cent. However, a "populist right co- alition" – made up of the EPP, the ECR, and ID – will increase their share of the seats from 43 per cent to 49 per cent. In addi- tion, the majority of the non-at- tached MEPs are from extreme right parties, meaning that with their support, majority coalitions could form to the right of RE for the first time in the history of the European Parliament. "EU-critics" on the radical right and radical left will increase dra- matically to hold 37 per cent of the seats, compared to 30 per cent in the current parliament. But the "pivotal MEP" in the next parliament is likely to be in the EPP group, rather than in the centrist RE (or previously Liber- al) group for the first time. "In short, we expect that pop- ulist voices, particularly on the radical right, are likely to be loud- er after the 2024 elections than at any point since the Europe- an Parliament was first directly elected in 1979," the ECFR said. "A wake-up call" The academics and pollsters who modelled the study said the analysis should serve as a wake- up call for European policymak- ers about what is at stake in the 2024 European Parliament elec- tions. "The implications of this vote are far reaching for the geopo- litical direction of the European Council and European Commis- sion from 2024 onwards. The next European Parliament can be expected to block legislation necessary to implement the po- litically difficult next phase of the Green Deal – impacting the EU's climate sovereignty – and push for a harder line on key issues for other areas of EU sovereignty in- cluding migration, enlargement, and support for Ukraine," they said. National governments will feel constrained by the way these elections shape domestic debates, affecting the positions they can take in the European Council. "This is likely to bolster the grow- ing axis of governments around the European Council table that are attempting to limit the EU's influence from within – those of Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, Sweden, and likely a PVV-led government in the Netherlands." These findings are set against the expectation that whether or not Donald Trump wins the US presidential election in autumn 2024, Europe will have a less globally engaged United States to rely on. "This may increase the incli- nation of anti-establishment and Eurosceptic parties to reject strategic interdependence and a broad range of international partnerships in defence of Euro- pean interests and values, instead seeking to pursue a more cau- tious approach to foreign policy decisions," the ECFR said. "Progressive policymakers need to start considering the trends that are driving these voting pat- terns and begin preparing narra- tives that can cut through them," the academics added. For example, they said policy- makers must evangelise on the economic and security impera- tives – not the costs and risks – in driving forward the green transi- tion and supporting Ukraine. They also said they had to "rec- ognise the nuances in European citizens' thinking" rather than resorting to the fear-driven nar- ratives that the far right is using successfully. "For example, on climate, after the supply insecurity brought about by Russia's war on Ukraine, there is a public will to rely less on fossil fuels. After the drastic weather events affecting many EU countries and reports of worse to come, there is a desire not to lose momentum on climate action, and with the new green compet- itiveness framing from the US, there is a will among the business community to embrace green tech – with support from their governments to de-risk supply chains, and with investment and the right regulatory and permit- ting environment." About the authors Kevin Cunningham is a lecturer in politics, political strategist, and pollster. Simon Hix is Stein Rokkan chair in comparative politics at the European University Institute in Florence. He was previous- ly vice-president of the London School of Economics. Susi Dennison is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations and the di- rector of ECFR's European Power programme. Imogen Learmonth is a re- searcher and programme manag- er at Datapraxis, an organisation that provides strategic advice, public opinion research, and modelling and analysis services. Left: Italy's Gorgia Meloni with Viktor Orban, prime minister of Hungary Above: Alternative for Germany's Tino Chrupalla and Alice Weidel at a rally in 2022