Issue link: https://maltatoday.uberflip.com/i/1542822
6 COMMERCIAL maltatoday | SUNDAY • 25 JANUARY 2026 Social dialogue in EU labour mobility policy: Evidence, contradictions, and limitations THE European Union's commitment to social dialogue remains strong. At least on paper. The March 2025 Pact for European Social Dialogue futher formalized the role of trade unions and employers in shaping labour policy by manifesting dialogue and reporting mechanisms as a way to com- municate stakeholder concerns. But in domains where mobility and labour rights collide, mainly EU labour mobility within low-wage service sectors, social dialogue so far remains a procedural mechanism large- ly disconnected from policy outcomes. This disconnection becomes particular- ly acute in cross-border care work, where structural mobility challenges persist de- spite plenty stakeholder consultation, as documented in the preliminary outcomes of the 2024-2026 MOBILECARE project. Dialogue without teeth The 2025 Social Dialogue Pact represents procedural strengthening. Commission consultations on work programmes, fund- ing for social partners and a formal mech- anism for receiving joint social partner re- ports on dialogue implementation all mark institutional progress. Implementation dia- logues convened in September 2025 by EC Vice-President Roxana Mînzatu specifically addressed labour mobility in free workers movement, posting, and social security co- ordination domains. Yet some might con- template that the improved institutional visibility veils an asymmetry: consultation and implementation are drifting apart. So- cial partners negotiate, the Commission listens and reads reports, but following en- forcement architectures remains sparse. Consider the Adequate Minimum Wage Directive (2022/2041) . Secured through tripartite negotiation some regard it as a cornerstone of the European Pillar of Social Rights Principle 8 on worker involvement. It binds Member States to promote collec- tive bargaining and ensure adequate wages. Member States remain free to define "ad- equacy", ranging from 46 to 60 percent of average wages.Yet its implementation has been uneven. In November 2025, the UNI Global Union remarks that only Ireland, Latvia, and Lithuania published national ac- tion plans promoting collective bargaining . On the contrary, Denmark challenged the Directive's legal basis , arguing it infringes pay sovereignty of Member States. While the European Court of Justice upheld the Directive's validity , the message is clear: social dialogue can produce consensus in talks, it does not ensure implementation. MobileCare and the gap between evi- dence and enforcement The MobileCare project, funded by the European Commission and grounded in multi-country expert dialogue, identified a critical paradox . Member States exhibit widely divergent social dialogue practices on live-in care mobility. Where nation- al social dialogue on a topic is weak, as in parts of Germany and Southern Europe on live-in caregiving, EU-level consulta- tion produces minimal traction on national level. Where dialogue is stronger, such as Austria and parts of Scandinavia, nation- al-level outcomes can emerge. However, these remain localized and do not scale to EU-wide mobility standards. The project's evidence, informed by Delphi expert pan- els and stakeholder workshops across sev- en countries, demonstrates that national labour market institutions shape mobility outcomes far more than the EU-level does. In this project Germany provides one of several examples of lacking enforcement. EU law permits posting of third-country nationals (TCNs) lawfully employed in one Member State to another without duplicate work permits, as established in Vander Elst (C-43/93) ruling . Despite Social Dialogue recommendations to align practice with EU law, Germany continues to require sep- arate work authorization for posted TCN caregivers, de facto blocking this mobility pathway. Actors organised within the social dialogue partners of Postcare and Mobile- care that are experimenting with posted TCN placements as late as 2025 reportedly abandoned the model following German enforcement actions and legal advice. All of that despite an EU court ruling that made clear mobility is not to be constrained . This is not a social dialogue failure; this is a dia- logue implementation failure. The rules ex- ist. The dialogue confirmed them. National practice contradicts both. Sectoral commitments without enforce- ment Another example remains to be observed: In June 2025, the European Public Service Union (EPSU) and Social Employers signed a Framework of Action on Retention and Recruitment in social services . A major achievement of the new EU Sectoral Social Dialogue Committee for social services. The framework commits to 15 concrete actions across education, safe staffing levels, work-life balance, and collective bargaining . Yet these remain non-binding recommendations. They require national implementation and further collective agreement in every nation. The EPSU announcement states: This "is both a commitment from the EU level social partners for social services and an urgent call to action for all who shape social services." A less optimistic translation: EU social partners commit and give guidance; governments are ex- pected to act; but if they do not, the dia- logue process was in vain. Social dialogue fragmenting from within However, not all social dialogue limits are caused by missing execurion. In la- bour mobility, dialogue often stalls be- cause social partners do not converge. The live-in caregiving sector illustrates this. MOBILECARE and POSTCARE ev- idence shows employer representatives framing cross-border care primarily as a labour-supply solution under affordabil- ity constraints. Long rotations and on- site presence are treated as functional necessities that are considered accept- able regarding a prevailing set of regu- latory and market conditions. Unions in contrast define the same practices as structural circumvention of worktime and rest-period rules. The result is not compromise but a mutual silent veto. Dialogues produce abstract consensus goals such as quality care, education and fair conditions, while avoiding operational questions that can- not be agreed upon, such as derogations for practicability or mechanisms to compensate the costs that derive from a lack thereof. Also the 2025 EPSU-So- cial Employers Framework reflects this: ambitious language, cautious substance. Where dialogue cannot converge, EU institutions have little to transpose and political actors are bound to disappoint in either direction. A debate worth having The real question is not whether EU social dialogue exists: it does, increas- ingly institutionalized and well-funded. Which is a great success. It is important and well worth it to have representatives heard and on board when designing pol- icies, despite all existing shortcomings . However, now debate should pivot to whether social dialogue can evolve from procedural consultation into a mecha- nism with direct links to (labour mobil- ity) policy outcomes. Until social part- ner agreements carry some weight, e.g. through enforcement plans, EU legal grounding, or explicit transposition ob- ligations with monitoring, they will re- main evidence-rich, politically cautious, and limited to practically employ change. The care sector crisis will worsen not because social partners lack a voice, but because that voice has been heard, doc- umented, and politely shelved, if not by the EU then by its member states.