Issue link: https://maltatoday.uberflip.com/i/1543413
5 maltatoday | WEDNESDAY • 25 FEBRUARY 2026 ANALYSIS Five lessons from Ukraine rooted in respect for international law and neutrality. James Debono draws five lessons from the conflict try subsequently reaffirmed its stance in favour of Ukraine's territorial integrity. While Malta has consistently protect‑ ed its national interests, particularly regarding the risks posed by diverting Russian assets to help Ukraine, it has never acted like a pariah, as Viktor Or‑ bán's Hungary continues to do. 2. Consistency in applying principles is essential — and perceptions of double standards matter A core strength of neutrality is its claim to an independent moral yard‑ stick applicable to different scenarios ir‑ respective of the actors involved. In fact, credibility hinges on consistent applica‑ tion of the same moral yardstick amid criticism that the West has applied dif‑ ferent yardsticks to Ukraine and Gaza. In this sense, Malta's role as a bridge builder between the EU and the Glob‑ al South, where the dissonance is most felt, can be enhanced by being proactive on both issues. In this respect, despite being neutral, Malta has lagged behind peers who were more proactive on other conflicts. Some EU member states, both neutral (Ireland) and NATO members (Spain), moved early to recognise the State of Palestine, whereas Malta waited for the lead of larger powers such as the United Kingdom and France. Moreover, Spain and Ireland have al‑ so withdrawn from the Eurovision Song Contest, which has rightly banned Rus‑ sian entries but permitted Israeli par‑ ticipation despite the loss of more than 70,000 lives in Gaza. Malta's reluctance to do the same speaks volumes on its willingness to walk its talk on respect for international law. In contrast European Commissioner for Sport Glenn Micallef has admirably said he will boycott the opening cere‑ mony of the 2026 Winter Paralympics in Milan Cortina in protest at the de‑ cision to allow Russian and Belarusian athletes to compete under their nation‑ al flags, arguing that he cannot support reinstating national symbols while Rus‑ sia's war of aggression against Ukraine continues. 3. The EU is becoming a political– military alliance, and Malta must define its place within it Malta entered the EU in 2004 along‑ side fellow neutral members like Aus‑ tria, Sweden, and Finland. Since the invasion, Sweden and Finland have joined NATO, narrowing the bloc of non‑aligned EU states. This may well have been one of Rus‑ sia's failures: what was presented as a war triggered by Ukraine's NATO am‑ bitions ended up effectively doubling the total length of Russia's frontline with NATO allies. At the same time, EU institutions have moved toward integrated defence planning, with initiatives such as the €800 billion ReArm Europe defence investment framework and legal ad‑ justments to allow coordinated defence spending — measures Malta ultimately supported in Council votes, even if its contribution remains non‑combatant and voluntary. To some extent, Malta's position would be more tenable if the EU itself builds its own security infra‑ structure, even if this raises questions on its own, especially if defence spend‑ ing starts cutting into budgets and pre‑ cludes investment in addressing the so‑ cial discontent that fuels the rise of the Putin‑ and Trump‑friendly far right. While Malta's constitutional neutrali‑ ty limits direct military engagement, its votes and participation in shaping EU security policy underscore that neutral‑ ity need not equate to marginalisation. 4. Neutrality does not shield Malta from vulnerability — and conflict spill overs test that reality Being classed as "unfriendly" by Rus‑ sia after sanctions, illustrates that small states cannot escape geopolitical con‑ sequences. Moreover, a recent drone incident linked to Israel involving a flo‑ tilla near Maltese waters underscored that even non‑belligerent states can be drawn into the fold of external conflicts. Neutrality does not magically insulate — it merely situates response capacity within legal and diplomatic frameworks. As threats evolve to include cyber and hybrid tactics, Malta's security calculus must balance constitutional principles with pragmatic cooperation, much of which flows through EU mechanisms. Furthermore, developments in east‑ ern Europe have raised strategic anxie‑ ties beyond Ukraine's borders: fears in the Baltics and in Republic of Moldova about potential future exploitation of Russian‑speaking minorities reflect a security landscape where territorial en‑ croachment, once unthinkable, is again plausible. As EU members, we cannot escape our obligations towards fellow members. Article 42(7) of the Treaty on Europe‑ an Union (TEU) does include a "mutual defence clause," which states that if an EU member is the victim of armed ag‑ gression on its territory, other members have an obligation to aid and assist "by all the means in their power." But so far, the ability to respond has been tied to NATO commitments. It could well be in Malta's interest if this obligation is grounded in a European framework independent of NATO, especially in a scenario where the US itself is threaten‑ ing the sovereignty of EU members like Denmark over Greenland. 5. Trump's aggressive posturing on Greenland has raised questions on NATO's endurance, raising the security profile of the EU — and Malta's security calculus must adapt When Trump openly suggested seiz‑ ing Greenland from Denmark and ex‑ pressed impatience with NATO com‑ mitments, questions arose about the reliability of traditional guarantees. Moreover, Trump's invocation of the Monroe Doctrine to justify interven‑ tions in the Americas could well em‑ bolden other powers, including Russia, Turkey, India and China, to make simi‑ lar claims in their own backyards. Some European leaders still seek to flatter Washington — Mark Rutte, now head of NATO and formerly Dutch prime minister, quipped about calling Trump "big daddy"—but there is grow‑ ing recognition that Europe must build strategic autonomy. Concomitantly, voices like Friedrich Merz and Emmanuel Macron have ar‑ gued for stronger European defence capabilities independent of the transat‑ lantic anchor. For Malta, this evolving reality means that the EU may increasingly be the framework in which its security is em‑ bedded. Neutrality, in this context, be‑ comes less a withdrawal from politics. This is because we are still sitting on the table along other EU members where decisions on foreign policy and security are taken. The fact that Malta has not obstructed EU plans, without directly participating in any military build‑up, has so far worked well. How long this arrangement will last, depends on Mal‑ ta carving its own niche alongside other neutral EU members like Ireland. Ultimately, the war in Ukraine has not rendered Malta's neutrality superfluous. But it has reshaped its operational con‑ text. Reframing it within an emerging multipolar reality, in which the Europe‑ an Union must assert itself and make its voice count, is now inevitable. Prime Minister Robert Abela offered Malta as a platform for peace for world's warring parties when addressing the UN General Assembly in New York in September 2025