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14 maltatoday | SUNDAY • 5 APRIL 2026 Economist JP Fabri OPINION ON 31 March, Malta celebrat- ed Freedom Day, marking the moment in 1979 when foreign military forces left our shores and the country took full control of its destiny. It was a defining transition, not just politically but economically, as Malta began to shape its own path in an increas- ingly complex world. This sense of sovereignty was later embedded in our Con- stitution through neutrality, a principle that commits Malta to non-alignment while actively promoting peace, cooperation, and progress across nations. Yet, neutrality was never in- tended to mean detachment. It was designed as a framework through which Malta could en- gage with the world on its own terms, maintaining flexibility in how it builds relationships and positions itself economically. In today's fragmented and increas- ingly polarised global landscape, this distinction is becoming more relevant, not less. Recent years have demonstrat- ed how quickly global events can translate into domestic conse- quences. The war in Ukraine reshaped energy markets across Europe, exposing deep structur- al vulnerabilities in supply and pricing. Tensions in the Middle East, particularly those involving Iran, are once again highlighting how conflict, climate pressures, and food systems are deeply in- tertwined. What may appear as distant geopolitical develop- ments quickly filter through to economies like Malta's, affecting energy costs, food imports, sup- ply chains, and ultimately the cost of living. In this context, sovereignty can no longer be understood purely in political or territorial terms. It must increasingly be seen through the lens of systems and capabilities. The ability to secure food, manage energy exposure, protect digital infrastructure, and maintain continuity in times of disruption has become central to economic resilience. Neutral- ity, when interpreted strategical- ly, offers Malta a degree of agility in navigating these complexities, but agility on its own is not suf- ficient. It must be accompanied by deliberate investment in are- as that strengthen the country's capacity to absorb and adapt to shocks. Food security offers one of the clearest examples of this evolv- Retired colonel and former deputy commander AFM David P. Attard Tracing the drone strike back to Libya THE shadowy maritime strike on the Rus- sian LNG tanker Arctic Metagaz in the early hours of 3 March 2026 immediately sparked allegations of Ukrainian involve- ment. Russian senior leaders immediate- ly claimed the attack was launched from Libya's western coast. Russian sources also indicated that at least three Magu- ra maritime drones, along with two or more aerial drones struck the LNG tanker approximately 150 miles off the Libyan coast of Sirte—a geographical point just outside Malta's search and rescue region. Although the Russian reports remain officially unverified by third party inde- pendent sources and the Ukrainian au- thorities have not officially claimed the attack, this incident represents a nota- ble escalation. It was the first reported strike by Ukraine on a fully laden tanker operated by Russia's shadow fleet. Pri- or operations targeted unladen shadow fleet ships or Russian military vessels. The attack on a fully loaded tanker in the central Mediterranean by Ukraine also suggests a significant widening of operational scope within a much larger area of operations. The Arctic Metagaz was hit in its en- gine room and in two separate LNG compartments—one hit was located on port side and the other on starboard side—causing flooding that left the vessel crippled but still floating. The precision and placement of the three strikes identified suggest a highly co- ordinated operation. The incident also indicates that Ukraine now possesses the capability to project force across the central Mediterranean through Lib- ya, potentially putting all the Russian shadow fleet's maritime assets transit- ing through the area at risk. It also has other options to strike shipping in the Mediterranean. Central to the attack is a 'base' in west- ern Libya near the Mellitah Oil Com- plex. In October and November 2025, this 'base' reportedly underwent slip- way upgrades for the launch of mari- time drones as well as the installation of communication support infrastructure necessary for the command and control of the same drone vessels. Sources also indicate that the Ukrain- ian presence in Libya stems from a broader cooperation agreement for- malised last October, following a re- quest by Ukraine's military attaché in Algeria, General Andriy Payuk. These Ukrainian deployments were alleged- ly subsequently formally approved by Libya's Government of National Uni- ty under Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh and the Libyan Under-Sec- retary of Defence Abdul Slam Zubi. In exchange for these deployment rights to Libya, Ukraine is said to provide drones and associated drone training as well as arms sales support to Libya. Addi- tionally, Ukrainian military personnel have been actively present in three lo- cations in western Libya, namely the Libyan Air Force Academy in Misurata, at the small base near Mellitah and at the 111th Brigade camp in Tripoli. The Tripoli camp reportedly also functions as a co-ordination and liaison centre be- tween Ukrainian personnel and Libyan officials. In recent months, forces aligned with Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh received new drone shipments via a neighbouring country, with Ukraini- an experts overseeing deployment and maintenance. These developments re- flected the growing Tripoli–Kyiv ties, partly driven by Libyan GNU efforts to counter Russian influence in east- ern Libya. Interestingly, back in August 2025, a Libyan militia by the name of Special Deterrence Force claimed it had downed three Ukrainian-made recon- naissance drones over Mitiga Air Base in Libya. These drones were reported- ly part of a larger shipment acquired through intermediaries, demonstrating a complex network of procurement and arms transfers. Algerian intelligence has also accused Ukraine's Military Attaché, Colonel Andriy Bayuk of exploiting diplomat- ic immunity to facilitate such drone transfers. These allegations fit a broad- er narrative of Ukraine expanding its footprint in African conflict zones to counter Russian influence and Wag- ner Group presence there. Reports al- so suggest drones of Ukrainian origin have appeared beyond Libya, including northern Mali where Ukraine reported- ly supports Tuareg separatists and Su- dan, assisting forces aligned with Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. Some sources even suggest potential Ukrainian support, be it direct or indirect to armed groups in Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali, opposing governments allied with Russia. These inter-connected reports represent a sig- nificant escalation in the Ukraine-Rus- sia war, which is now extending into north Africa and the Sahel. In addition, Libya's fractured political and security landscape makes it more susceptible to such proxy activities. The attack on the Arctic Metagaz in Malta's backyard also highlights a shift- ing dynamic in modern warfare where geographically distant conflicts mani- fest themselves around us with the pro- liferation of drone technologies. These geopolitical rivalries and wars are now spilling into new, often unstable arenas such as Libya. In fact, the Arctic Metagaz incident has made it very clear that the shadow war between Kyiv and Moscow is no longer confined to eastern Europe. It is now also unfolding much closer to home. The Magura V5 sea drone, the likes of which were probably used to strike the Russian LNG carrier Arctic Metagaz in the central Mediterranean