Issue link: https://maltatoday.uberflip.com/i/1544415
THE mechanism for the ap- pointment of a chief justice is fundamental to maintain- ing judicial independence and public confidence in the judi- ciary. It follows, therefore, that the power of appointing some- one to such an important office should not be vested exclusive- ly in the executive government. An important requirement of sustaining public confidence in the judiciary is the openness and transparency in appoint- ing a chief justice who is, after all, a 'primus inter pares', that is to say, the first among equals who, consequently, has the power and authority to exer- cise control and oversight over his judicial peers. Of course, openness and transparency in making ap- pointments essentially depend on the mechanisms for ap- pointment. The mechanism for appointment plays an im- portant role in selecting the person having the professional skills and qualities that are re- quired for a chief justice in an independent judiciary, more so considering that, based on our Constitution, a chief justice can be appointed from among practising lawyers who are not already serving judges or mag- istrates, albeit having to meet the legal qualifications of a judge, namely, at least 12 years of practice/service. The whole system depends largely on the political culture and social values of our society. Malta has adopted the two- thirds majority parliamentary approval mechanism to ap- point the chief justice. Under this mechanism, the govern- ment initially selects the can- didate for this supreme judi- cial office but makes a formal appointment only when the selection is approved by parlia- ment. Parliamentary approval pro- vides a check on the power of the executive, and there is scope for public scrutiny of the appointment process. Nevertheless, this system has some inherent defects. Firstly, parliament has nothing to do with the initial stages of select- ing the candidate. Since the in- itial selection of a candidate is a vital issue in appointing the chief justice, and it is exclusive- ly vested in the executive, this system may not be effective in controlling pre-eminent politi- cal or other irrelevant consid- erations in selecting a candi- date for this judicial office. Rather, it may foster an in- creasing tendency to introduce political bargaining. Secondly, although the requirement of approval by parliament may impose some restrictions on the discretion of the executive government, it may not be ef- fective to change the basic form of 'political infighting'. Thirdly, if the party in pow- er commands an overwhelm- ing majority in parliament, political 'patronage may still be a strong factor' in appoint- ing the executive's preferred candidate. The parliamentary mechanism is transparent and open to public scrutiny, but if there is such a majority in par- liament, nothing can be done, even if the public does not ap- prove of the appointment. The appointment of a chief justice is critical to judicial in- dependence, as exclusive ex- ecutive control can lead to the public's perception of political bias and influence, undermin- ing democratic principles. To ensure impartiality, appoint- ments should ideally involve transparent, merit-based pro- cesses, such as independent ju- dicial councils or consultation with the judiciary. In our case, there has been an ongoing debate regarding the need for greater involvement of the judiciary in the appoint- ment of the chief justice to align with Council of Europe recommendations. As we saw in the run-up to the appointment of the last two chief justices, it was rare for any efforts to be made to con- sult with experts in the field, or even with the departing of- ficeholders themselves, before a decision was made to nomi- nate a candidate. This increas- es the risk of disagreement be- tween the prime minister and the Opposition leader. In order to maintain public confidence in the appointment system and to ensure judicial independence, I would dare to say that a commission sys- tem is perhaps a very effective mechanism for the judicial appointment of a chief justice. However, to ensure the effec- tiveness of this mechanism, the commission should be repre- sentative in nature, comprising members of the executive, leg- islature, judiciary, legal profes- sion and laypersons. In addi- tion, it should be ensured that the commission uses a system which is transparent and open to public scrutiny. 9 maltatoday | WEDNESDAY • 15 APRIL 2026 OPINION The appointment of the chief justice and judicial independence Mark Said Veteran lawyer in the Chapel of Church, Valletta bears the inscription "Charitas", recalling the charitable founda- tions established by the couple in support of the Confraternity of Our Lady of Charity. Conservation within the Jesu- its' Church Heritage Programme The conservation of these paintings forms part of the broader programme dedicated to the preservation of the Jesu- its' Church and its artistic patri- mony, led by the Jesuits' Church Foundation. The works will undergo professional conserva- tion treatment accompanied by detailed documentation and re- search. The project also contributes to the wider objectives of the Collegium Melitense Research Project, which seeks to integrate historical research, conservation science, and cultural heritage in- terpretation related to the Jesuit complex in Valletta. Through this initiative, the Jesuits' Church Foundation continues its commitment to safeguarding Malta's religious, artistic and cultural heritage while making it accessible to both scholars and the wider pub- lic. Joseph Doublet and Professor Keith Sciberras, and the conservation works will be carried John's Co-Cathedral Foundation It should be ensured that the commission uses a system which is transparent and open to public scrutiny.