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maltatoday, WEDNESDAY, 5 FEBRUARY 2014 8 JAMES DEBONO A memorandum by former Prime Minister George Borg Olivier pre- sented to Cabinet on 10 March 1965 shows that the Maltese gov- ernment was considering the clo- sure of the NATO headquarters in Malta. This was one of five options Borg Olivier's administration was con- sidering in reaction to the military alliance's refusal to admit Malta as a full member. According to the memorandum penned by Borg Olivier, "the with- drawal of NATO from Malta is an option which deserves consid- eration". The memorandum does not mince words in saying that "Malta is not enjoying any mate- rial benefits from the presence of HAFMED (Headquarters Allied Forces Mediterranean)". It described Malta's undefined relationship with NATO as "a political liabilit y", because while an attack on any NATO member state would have involved Malta in a war due to the British pres- ence in Malta, no clear obligation on NATO existed to intervene on Malta's behalf in case of attack. "Malta is presently an appendage to NATO with no share in the for- mation of policy." The memorandum explored sev- eral options for Malta's future re- lationship with NATO including a unilateral offer of protection by NATO, associate membership in NATO and withdrawal from the organisation. The main drawback of the clos- ing down of NATO facilities in Malta, according to Borg Olivier, was that this step could have led to a further reduction of the UK military base. While noting that it was un- known whether the British wished to retain any defence installation if HAFMED in Floriana was shut down, Borg Olivier believed that Italy would still have had a vested interest in the "close association" of Malta with the West. Borg Olivier observed that from a defence aspect, Italy stood to lose from Malta's independence as it would had to face the risk of Malta being overrun by a politi- cal enemy or subscribing to doc- trines "inimical to the principles of NATO". The memorandum concludes that although the indications were that full membership is not attainable, as some members were opposed to Malta's inclusion in the organisation, "a sure way of forcing the issue would be to make a formal request for admission of membership to NATO". Associate membership was de- scribed as a status which could be regarded "as commensurate to our size and contribution" which would give full protection to Mal- ta. But Malta would still have been denied a vote in the council of Ministers "and would not be able to inf luence policy". The memorandum was prepared after a meeting between Borg Ol- ivier and NATO deput y general secretary J.A. Roberts, two days after independence, on 23 Sep- tember 1964. In the meeting, Roberts suggest- ed that an immediate application for full membership should not be submitted. Roberts also asked for "tangible evidence" that Malta would give full facilities to HAFMED and its personnel to "enjoy all privileges and immunities" enjoyed before independence. He even went as far as suggest- ing the wording of the document to be signed by Malta. Borg Ol- ivier replied that the govern- ment was prepared to ensure that HAFMED would continue to en- joy all present privileges and im- munities. But he did not exclude in any way an eventual application for full membership in the organi- sation. But despite Borg Olivier's dis- comfort with Malta's subservient relationship to NATO, this state of affairs continued to persist in the following years. A memoran- dum by the Minister for Foreign Affairs presented in February 1969 reveals that NATO was ask- ing Malta to host an "on call force" in Malta. The force was to be initially composed of three ships provided by Italy, the United Kingdom and the US. The aim of this force was to "demonstrate the solidarit y of NATO nations and to contribute to the overall deterrent in the Mediterranean". The force was to be called up for training exercises twice a year and could be called to "demonstrate NATO naval presence in a threat- ened area". In the memorandum, the foreign minister declared that while the Maltese government was in favour of closer ties with NATO it was under constant "internal pres- sure" on this issue. Therefore the memorandum suggests that further military co- operation must be accompanied by tangible economic benefits. It also raises the question on wheth- er Malta should have accepted the force in the absence of defence guarantees, especially if the Soviet Union regards Malta's role in the new force as an "unfriendly act". NATO asked to finance new power plant The demand for financial as- sistance from NATO countries resurfaces in a Cabinet memoran- dum presented by the Minister for Trade on 20 September 1968. According to the memorandum, NATO general secretary Man- lio Brosio had suggested that al- though NATO could not dispose of any such funds, it could in- f luence member nations to take greater interests in the economic needs of Malta. The memorandum suggests that the aid should be directed towards the construction of a new power station which should have been operational by 1977. The docu- ment reveals that a suitable site for the new power plant was be- ing selected and suggests a 'south eastern' location of the plant in view of the free port zone pro- jected in the area. The overall cost of the new power plant was put at £28 million. Relations with Soviet Union A memorandum presented to Cabinet in 1966 reveals that the government was at pains refus- ing overtures of friendship from the Soviet Union, which was de- manding diplomatic representa- tion in Malta. The demand was reiterated in a letter attached to a gift to the Prime Minister, on the occasion of the launching of the space craft Luna 9. The government was warding off the Soviets by suggesting that relations should be conducted through representatives in Lon- don. The excuse given was that Malta was not able to cope with the establishment of further dip- lomatic missions in Valletta. "So far Malta has been able to hold off the Soviet Union on what can only be described as very implausible reasons," the report states. It warns that "any more rebuffs to the Soviet Union might provoke hostilit y" and notes that Malta was alone not to have dip- lomatic relations with the USSR. It also states that relations with the Soviet Union were inevitable "whatever the internal political difficulties in taking such a step". While acknowledging the "danger in receiving aid from the USSR", Western states "should not take Malta too much for granted ". Sugar-coated agreement with Taiwan An aide memoire issued in April 1967 reveals that Taiwan prom- ised 9,000 tonnes of sugar as a do- nation to Malta following the es- tablishment of formal diplomatic relations between Malta and the Republic of China. At that time Taiwan still claimed to represent the entiret y of China, questioning the legitimacy of the People's Republic under commu- nist rule. Taiwan was extremely grateful for the support given by Malta to Taiwan in the United Na- tions. Another memorandum dealt with a request by Israel to estab- lish diplomatic representation in 1964. The report suggests "an atti- tude of complete neutralit y in the dispute between the Arab world and Israel " and that friendliness must be shown towards both camps. Therefore requests for diplomatic representation should be accepted from both sides. CABINET PAPERS REVEALED Borg Olivier considered closing down NATO base Cabinet papers shed light on former Prime Minister George Borg Olivier's strained relationship with NATO The former NATO headquarters in Floriana Borg Olivier observed that from a defence aspect, Italy stood to lose from Malta's independence as it would had to face the risk of Malta being overrun by a political enemy YOUR FIRST CLICK OF THE DAY www.maltatoday.com.mt George Borg Olivier

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