Issue link: https://maltatoday.uberflip.com/i/709569
14 AS news and footage of the recent coup attempt in Turkey unfolded in the media, I couldn't help but wonder what it would feel like if the country in question were my own. Naturally, this sentiment is not limited to Turkey: the same thought flits through my mind whenever I see images of conflict and upheaval, anywhere in the world. With Turkey, however, it im- mediately feels closer to home, as it were. Far closer than a similar coup in Latin America, for in- stance. One can just imagine, therefore, what it felt like to someone like Tolga Temuge: a Turkish national who has been resident in Malta for the past 13 years, and who is also a vociferous political activist in his own right. Locally, he is bet- ter known for his association with environmental NGOs… being a former CEO of BirdLife Malta, and Campaign Director for Green- peace Mediterranean. But Temuge is also keenly in- volved in Turkish politics, and has been for many years. He makes no secret of his opposition to the rul- ing Erdogan government. But in contributions to the local press, he seems to be equally wary of the suspected mastermind behind the failed coup: Fethullah Gulen, the founder and leader of a rather ob- scure Islamic movement. It seems natural to ask him how he felt on a personal level, as he watched all this unfold from afar. "I was walking back home from a very pleasant evening at the Slie- ma Arts Festival… and my mum called, asking me whether I knew if there was a military coup in Tur- key. I had no idea at the time. So when I got home I sat down and tried to follow the news: not only from the news portals in Turkey, but also from my own contacts. Honestly, my first reaction was that this looked like… I don't want to call it a 'false flag operation', but it looked like a trap set by Er- dogan… In fact, a lot of people shared that reaction. Does Temuge still con- sider that a possibility? "My feelings have not changed 100% yet. There was something that felt staged or somehow wrong with what I was seeing. Howev- er as the days passed, and more footage became available… more credible eyewitness testimonials emerged… you realise that it was actually quite a big operation. It wasn't just a rogue group acting within the military. As of yester- day [Wednesday], around 40% of the top military personnel – gen- erals, admirals, etc. – are either in custody, or arrested. So basically almost half the military command is suspected of involvement…" That is true, but the operative word there is 'suspected'. Part of the concerns expressed interna- tionally (for instance, by the EU) is that Erdogan may exploit the emergency to consolidate his own power-base and increase his gov- ernment's grip on power… possi- bly through a purge of the opposi- tion… "Turkey has been moving in that direction for the past 13 years, since Erdogan came to power. So it is no surprise. However, we must also bear in mind the consequenc- es if the coup attempt was suc- cessful… though from the outset I don't think that was possible." This, too, is part of the reason some people suspect the coup may have been staged by Erdogan him- self. "One of the scenarios I described in an article this week is that Er- dogan knew this was coming. He didn't have to stage it himself; he could simply let it happen. Let me be clear on one thing: I am no friend of Erdogan. To be even clearer: I despise Erdogan, and what he represents. "However, over the last 10 years I have been looking closely at the Fethullah Gulen movement. It is not a conspiracy theory that these people have infiltrated the Turkish military, the judiciary, the police force, the education system, and so forth. And they have done this over the last three or four decades. They became extremely powerful under Erdogan: understandably, because both seem to be on the same side. To oversimplify: they are both Is- lamist. That is how it looks from the outside. But if you understand Turkish politics, especially its right-wing politics… these are two completely different groups. They represent distinct factions within political Islam. They did not trust or like each other from the very beginning…" Here Temuge breaks off to pro- vide a little background. "To un- derstand what is happening, you have to go back to a little before Erdogan came to power in 2002. There was a religious party, the Welfare Party, whose leader Nec- mettin Erbakan became Prime Minister. In 1998, the military car- ried out what is known as a 'soft coup'. No tanks in the streets, but the military forced the Prime Min- ister to resign. After that, there was a purge carried out by the secular- ist military command. They tried to cleanse the military, the police force, etc., from the Islamist 'mili- tants', as they were referred to…" Democracy was restored by 2002, and Erdogan came to power. "The military was still very strong in Turkish politics at the time. And Erdogan did not have a very well educated or trained base to assist the democratically elected govern- ment in state institutions. It was mostly occupied by different fac- tions, predominantly the Kemal- ists or the Nationalists. There is even a saying in Turkey: you can be democratically elected, but you can never rule the country. "This situation provided the Gu- lenists the perfect opportunity to form some sort of coalition with Erdogan, even if they never liked or trusted each other. The Gulen- ists were extremely well educated. Most of them studied in the USA or in Europe: they knew the bu- reaucracy, they spoke foreign lan- guages very well, they had Masters degrees in this and that… They also had people in the police force, the judiciary and state departments. So Erdogan relied on the intelli- gence coming from these people. And he was constantly fed false information: that the Turkish mili- tary was about to assassinate one of the top government officials… or Erdogan himself, or his family… or that they were planning an im- minent coup. Erdogan was already under constant political pressure from the military; now, there was this religious group telling him he was constantly under threat. So Erdogan gave them carte blanche. And, especially after 2008, the Gu- lenists started a number of opera- tions within the country. The main targets were the secularists, the nationalists and other potential 'coup plotters': what we refer to as members of the 'deep state', who were suspected of involvement in a number of assassinations and mass killings, especially in Turkish Kurdistan…" The range of targets, however, quickly grew. "Almost immedi- ately the Gulenists started target- ing the Opposition: anyone, in fact, they perceived to be a poten- tial threat. At the same time, they also carried out covert operations in the police force, the judiciary and the military: falsely accusing some top officers and having them arrested… I can say 'falsely' now, because the trials have come to an end, and we now know that all the evidence had been fabricated. "When this purge was taking place, the Gulenists were in coa- lition with Erdogan. Erdogan had put them in those positions; and he gave them whatever they need- ed. Basically, he supported them… until this group directly targeted Erdogan himself, with the 2013 corruption scandal. So in a nut- shell, this group has been empow- ered and protected by Erdogan, until it grew stronger than Er- dogan himself. And this is not the first time it tried to bring down Er- dogan's government. There were a couple of previous attempts, but these did not attract the same at- tention of Western media…" This brings us to the question of what difference actually exists between the two groups vying for power. Both seem to occupy the same niche in the complex spec- trum of Turkish politics, and have in the past been political 'allies' (even if out of convenience). How are the two groups different, and how would the coup have affected Turkey if successful? "Erdogan comes from an old po- litical Islamist movement. If you had to make a comparison, it is a bit like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The main difference is that Turkish political Islamist move- ments never resorted to so-called 'terrorist' tactics… maybe because the Turkish Republic was built on stronger foundations by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk than Egypt or Syria. Fethullah Gulen, on the other hand, comes from a completely different establishment. "In fact, after he left the established move- ment – known as the Nurcu Order – he went on to found his own, very different religious order. It is more like a cult. It might not be the best word to describe it, but I can only compare this organisa- tion to a cult. Or perhaps to Opus Dei. "The main difference is that Fethullah Gulen himself is the only leader of this cult; and his fol- lowers truly believe in him. If you listen to his speeches, or read his books… he uses this very difficult language: very poetic; almost ar- chaic, in fact. It's as though you need to understand their language in order to decode what he is say- ing. So there are experts, journal- ists, who have been following this sect for a while; and from what we understand, he presents himself as a sort of new Messiah or Prophet. And his followers tend to believe that…" This does not go down too well with the rest of Turkey's religious/ political establishment, Temuge adds. "The other religious organisa- tions hate this kind of sect. That is why they were completely isolated, and therefore more secretive. Al- Interview By Raphael Vassallo maltatoday, SUNDAY, 31 JULY 2016 Turkey is between a rock and a hard place. We were trying to get rid of Erdogan, and the only alternative being forced down our throat is Gulen. If you ask me, Gulen is worse CHOICE Between a rock and POPULAR MOOD If whoever was behind this operation thought the people of Turkey would welcome this military coup… that is a real misunderstanding of the people's sentiments