Issue link: https://maltatoday.uberflip.com/i/768342
maltatoday, SATURDAY, 31 DECEMBER 2016 14 9. MIDDLE EAST CONTINUES TO BURN If you thought 2016 was a bad year for the Middle East, 2017 will be worse. With the bloodshed in Syria, Iraq, Turkey, Yemen and elsewhere in the region, the anger, hatred and sectarian divides can only grow deeper. Turkey and Iran will continue vying to spread their sphere of influence, particularly in northern Syria and Iraq. The recent truce in Syria brokered by Turkey and Rus- sia is not expected to last long. And given the presence of Qatari and Saudi Arabian backed terrorist groups and Iran's involvement in the Syrian war the divisions be- tween Shia and Sunni Arabs have grown, paving a path towards greater conflict rather than reconciliation. Expect a weakened Islamic State to be slowly overshad- owed by Al-Nusra and Al Qaeda, but expect more ter- rorist attacks in Europe and elsewhere in the name of Daesh. An Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement is all but dead, especially given Trump's pro-Israel stance, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's persistence in building illegal settlements and the Arab world's lethargy to- wards the Palestinians. 10. FINLAND INTRODUCES BASIC INCOME Finland is embarking on the world's most ambitious experiment with giving people a guaranteed basic in- come. Starting in January, 2,000 unemployed people will begin receiving 560 euros every month with no strings attached. The new scheme, which will make Finland the first country in the world to test a universal basic income at the national level, will be managed by Finland's Social Insurance Institution. Recipients – randomly picked from a pool of people aged 25-58 years old who received unemployment ben- efits in November 2016 – will not pay tax on the basic income, even if they find work and earn a salary in ad- dition to it. The Canadian region of Ontario is also introducing a similar pilot project in 2017. In 2016, Switzerland rejected a similar proposal in a referendum but other countries such as the Nether- lands, Kenya and India are toying with the idea of in- troducing a universal income policy. News 13 THINGS TO LOOK OUT FOR IN 2017 Daniela Debono As we usher in 2017, we are still reeling from the effects of the so-called, and incorrectly named, 'refugee crisis'. The real crisis for refugees takes place long before they arrive in Europe. The crises are those which impel them to uproot, and move their lives and families, several times over. They are the wars, the persecution, the poverty, the desperate conditions in countries of transit and the sheer lack of opportunities to make a decent life. But what is understood by the 'refugee crisis' in Europe, and what does it say about the current state of play in the EU? The 'refugee crisis', originally coined by EU authorities, refers to the increase in the number of people crossing irregularly and seeking asylum in Europe in 2015 and 2016. Figures, UNHCR reminds us are insignificant when compared to refugee numbers in non-European countries, not to mention the vast numbers of internally displaced persons. The root causes of the 2015-2016 increase in numbers of people crossing into Europe across the Mediterranean Sea and through the South-Eastern land route were primarily the war in Syria, as well as deteriorating conditions in post-conflict Afghanistan, amongst others. What the authorities fail to explain is that such irregular crossings have to be understood also as the result of restrictive EU visa regimes, the conditions in transit countries and the enactment of border control in some areas which ultimately serve to channel people into a few concentrated flows. It is widely believed that the current 'refugee crisis' has passed, and efforts in the European Union are now focused on forecasting which, if at all possible, will allow the authorities to prepare and avoid emergencies. The real crisis however can be seen in the lack of agreements and conflicting demands from EU Member States. This signals profound divergences on the fundamental and founding values of the EU, such as solidarity and equality. Human rights and human dignity, which served as inspirational and revolutionary concepts in the last few hundred years, appear to have lost their significance. A chilling readiness to compromise on fundamental human rights standards is present and whilst this is often not explicit, it is an implicit assumption in many decisions taken in the field of migration and border control. For example, there are good grounds to believe that the EU's insistence on returning migrants will likely result in lowering human rights standards – I make this argument in a longer article in the international journal Human Geography. And the same approach disregarding human principles is apparent in Malta: the 2016 case of the flawed THP-n policy resulted in the detention with a view of deporting a group of Malians and where no regard is given to the fact that these people have been in Malta tolerated by the government for up to eight years. In 2017, we will see an ever-increasing emphasis on the return of migrants, and more problematically, deportation. This is a significant and dangerous shift. In previous years the policy approach was to build sustainable voluntary return structures, policies which were questioned and controversial for many reasons, among them the use of significant coercive measures which put into question the 'voluntariness' of return. This remains preferable however to forced return, or deportation. Even in countries like Sweden, generally well known for their efforts to mainstream human rights, it is difficult to speak of a 'humane and dignified' deportation. EU pressure to increase deportations will necessarily lead Member States to compromise on human rights and lower their standards during the deportation process. Another example of large-scale policies compromising human rights is the EU's externalisation of border management to third countries through agreements with specific states. The EU-Turkey deal is only one of them. These are dangerous because they are solely motivated by geopolitical interest, and therefore the EU, or EU Member States, enter into negotiations with third countries without first assessing the human rights standards practised in the countries or the way in which the authorities in those countries handle immigration issues. The latest development in these agreements is that funds for development aid, which admittedly have always been used strategically, are now being officially used as incentives or penalties for cooperating or failing to cooperate with deportation, repatriation and readmission of migrants. This can be seen in the newly endorsed 'Joint Way Forward' and the EU agreement with Afghanistan to return 80,000 Afghanis from Europe in return for the development aid. And more recently in December 2016 in the deal made with Mali. This was after all the rationale behind the infamous, from a human rights and global justice point of view, 2015 Valletta Summit on Migration. The EU-Turkey deal in 2016 created considerable controversy. The aim of this deal was to keep people from moving into Europe. In practice the irregular migrant flows consisted mainly of Syrians, Afghanis and Iraqis – three refugee generating countries whose political situation and conflicts are well known in Europe and to Europeans. The EU-Turkey deal was modelled on similar agreements that individual Member States like Spain and Italy had enacted with Morocco and Libya in previous years. These deals secure the desired outcome of reducing irregular migrant arrivals. What happens to migrants who were in need of asylum is another matter. In practice, such migrants are being denied the right to seek asylum. Turkey is not a signatory to the international refugee convention and does not offer international protection. It has tolerated immigrants and granted them a status, but there are worrying reports that show that first, vulnerable people are not being afforded due protection, second, the living conditions in many cases are not good, and third, the Turkish state offers migrants few opportunities for building a fruitful life. The EU Turkey deal can be seen as part of a larger thrust to enact discriminatory borders, under the guise of secure borders. The best example of such paradoxes, which has now become a 'classic' in Europe lest anyone thinks this is just a Maltese affair, is the Maltese IIP Citizenship. This is one of the easiest ways to access Europe and obtain full rights irrespective of which country you come from, or what else you can contribute to the country in terms of skills, labour or otherwise, as long as you have the financial means. EU immigration policies, or as some refer to it, Fortress Europe, are not about keeping everyone out – but only some. Contrary to the Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Route where migrant arrivals were quelled with the EU-Turkey agreement, irregular migrant boat arrivals have continued unabated on the Central Mediterranean Maritime Route. Italy in 2016 saw more than 175,000 irregular maritime arrivals. The number of arrivals is not dissimilar to previous years and therefore many have criticised the culture of 'emergency' that characterises the reception process in Italy. Too little is being done to address this culture by the authorities, which unfortunately is serving to justify various measures and inadequacies in management, at times resulting in inhumane treatment, which would otherwise not be acceptable. In 2017 we should not expect a decline of this emergency culture in the reception system in Italy. Operation Triton, the border security operation conducted by FRONTEX, the EU's border security agency, has not adequately addressed the loss of lives at sea which in In 2017 • Migration, asylum and Malta's EU presidency Despite the ceasfire agreed in recent days, there seems to be no end to the Syrian civil war