Issue link: https://maltatoday.uberflip.com/i/811845
maltatoday, SUNDAY, 16 APRIL 2017 17 Turkey referendum PAU L COCK S TURKISH voters will today decide if their country's political system will undergo its most profound transfor- mation since its conception. Eighteen constitutional amendments, including one creating an executive presidency, are being put to a single 'yes' or 'no' ballot. Currently, Turkey's executive au- thority rests with the cabinet, led by the prime minister as head of govern- ment, which shares legislative powers with the parliament. While the presi- dent is head of state and commander- in-chief of the armed forces, the posi- tion is largely ceremonial. Under the new system, the president would be- come both head of state and govern- ment, with the power to appoint sen- ior bureaucrats without parliamentary approval or judicial oversight. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Er- dogan argues that an executive presi- dency will relieve pressures burden- ing Turkey's economy, and allow the country to eliminate terrorist threats without the limitations posed by bu- reaucratic procedures. Indeed, one of the biggest arguments the 'yes' cam- paign has utilised is security: In the post-coup era, Turkey must be pre- pared to tackle threats to its sover- eignty. The reality is that, in practice, Tur- key already operates under a presiden- tial system. Erdogan has dominated Turkish politics since the Justice and Development Party's (AKP) rise to power in 2002. The party has seeming- ly weathered every obstacle in its path with Erdogan at its helm, overcom- ing inner-party squabbles, corruption probes, and the failed coup attempt in 2016. Even Turkey's diminishing eco- nomic prospects have yet to signifi- cantly impact perceptions among the AKP's support base. The AKP and its affiliates dominate government bureaucracy and me- dia. Erdogan's family members, most prominently his son-in-law and Min- ister of Energy Berat Albayrak, sit at Turkey's highest stations. The AKP cannot afford to lose Erdogan. It is with this awareness that the party has given him the powers he now seeks to legitimise. The desire to retain legitimacy has put Erdogan and the AKP on the de- fensive. They have backtracked on foreign policy issues, ranging from Syrian President Bashar Al Assad's removal to wavering relations with regional ac- tors such as Israel and Russia. Short of domestic control mechanisms, these decisions demonstrate executive prag- matism. In this light, it becomes clear why Prime Minister Binali Yildirim, who openly advocates for the elimi- nation of his post in the referendum campaign, was the AKP's natural al- ternative to the more independent- minded Ahmet Davutoglu. This asymmetry has chipped away at Turkey's public sphere, where little inclusivity remains. The coup attempt validated Erdogan's paranoia, while the 'us versus them' rhetoric took hold across the country. A mix of fear and nationalist outcry over the country's decades-long fight with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and evolving presence in northern Syria have spread the AKP's appeal among conservative nationalists, but also in- creased ethnic tensions. Additionally, a diplomatic row with traditional EU allies, fuelled by Erdogan's accusations of European Islamophobia and racism, has resonated among a populace feel- ing betrayed by years of false promises in the accession process. In the referendum, a 'yes' vote will validate Erdogan's long-standing am- bitions, and the AKP's bureaucratic monopoly but a 'no' vote will not re- verse what is already in place. The fears of authoritarianism born of a 'yes' win are only matched by the un- certainty of a decisive 'no'. In a country that has historically seen conflict between the president and prime minister and the spillover effects of fragile coalitions, a presiden- tial system may indeed be a stabilising force. Yet, Turkey has operated under the AKP's unwavering structure for more than a decade, and any instability, in- cluding Gulenist infiltration of the country's institutions, occurred on the party's watch. The damage of campaign polarisa- tion is already done: Tensions are run- ning high in both bureaucratic corri- dors, and in the region. Beyond accepting the results of the referendum, what political leaders will have to address in the aftermath of the fated decision is their willing- ness to go beyond party lines to usher in structural changes that can help Turkey's weakening economy recover, and mend the fragile ties of confidence that threaten to exclude Kurdish vot- ers from the political process. Erdogan has already secured his place as Turkey's most powerful leader since Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, but the referendum will determine whether his persona is strong enough to usher in a new Turkish breakaway. Erdogan on defensive in bid to retain legitimacy 'The prospects do not bode well' COMMENTARY MONIQUE AGIUS Today Turkey stands at crossroads. The people of Turkey are faced with a referendum where they asked to choose whether or not they will adopt or reject the constitutional proposals being forward by the AKP. The polls are showing that both the 'yes' and 'no' are head to head. The prospects do not bode well; a 'no' vote will be at the mercy of the President's next move, while if it's a 'yes' it will merely be a legalised continuation of the politics seen in the past months. In the run-up to the voting day, the 'yes' campaign had a pretty easy campaign, with the State seemingly pulling all its weight behind them while the 'no' campaign was denied from campaigning freely and had their campaigns relegated to non-conventional ways and social media. The opposition says tht if the yes vote wins we are likely to see Turkey transform itself from a parliamentary democracy into a single man rule. The office of the Prime Minister will be abolished and could see the President's term prolonged up to 2029. The AKP has passed a series of reforms, most of which have been tied around Turkey's bid to join the European Union. In its own way it also managed to reconcile neoliberalism with Islam. Although recently Erdogan and AKP have been branded as Islamist, it is not the entire picture. AKP is a centre- right nationalist party that represents the Sunnis in the Anatolian hinterland and the poorer districts in major cities who have been marginalised by the secular rule. The opposition on the other hand is fragmented more than ever. The HDP, which represents a plural democratic party, is slowly being wiped out of existence, starting from the detainment of their democratically-elected MPs whose immunity was lifted following the failed coup in July. Both co-chairs of the HDP are in prison, along with a number of other MPs. Mayors in the South East Turkey have also been detained and replaced by trustees appointed by the government. The Kurds are also a game-changer in the equation. While conservative rural Kurds have supported AKP in the past, the recent wave of violence against fellow Kurds could see them voting 'no'. And if in the predominantly Kurdish areas the 'no' vote gets somewhere between 60-75%, it also means that the Kurds are rejecting AKP's policy. Whatever the outcome of the referendum is, it is definitely painful to see Turkey going down this way. Monique Agius is a civil society activist and student of international relations • More than 55 million people are eligible to cast votes in some 167,000 ballot boxes at polling stations across the country. Close to 3 million expatriate Turkish citizens in 57 countries were also eligible to vote between March 27 and April 9 at Turkish diplomatic missions. • The "yes" camp argues that the proposed changes for a strong presidency will create a robust and stable Turkey, while the "no" side says they would give the office of the president too many powers with very few safeguards. • If approved in the referendum, the changes would transfer executive powers currently held by the prime minister to the president. The prime minister's office would be abolished. • The president would have the powers to dismiss ministers, issue decrees, declare a state of emergency, and make appointments to key positions. • The president can be elected for two consecutive five-year terms. However, some observers say an early election called in the second- term would reset the clock and allow the president to run for an extra term – meaning that Erdogan could rule until 2029 and beyond. • Referring the president to the country's top court for possible impeachment would require a two-thirds parliamentary majority. • The reforms would increase the number of seats in parliament from the current 550 to 600. The age of candidacy for a parliamentary seat would be lowered from 25 to 18. TURKISH REFERENDUM