Issue link: https://maltatoday.uberflip.com/i/1449240
8 NEWS maltatoday | WEDNESDAY • 9 FEBRUARY 2022 Who are the non-voters who keep the PN and PL guessing and will their numbers increase in the forthcoming election? Asks James Debono Young and educated: A profile of the Maltese political agnostic Who are Malta's political agnostics? 9% of all MaltaToday Survey respond- ents say they will not be voting – but 60% of these non-voters voted back in 2017: 32% PN, 28% PL 21% of all respondents trust neither Grech nor Abela 34% of tertiary educated voters trust neither Grech nor Abela 90% of current non-voters trust neither Grech nor Abela 9% of respondents in the latest MaltaTo- day survey say they will not vote in the forthcoming election, with this share os- cillating between 9% and 13% in the past year, and not so different from the 9% of voters who invalidated or did not vote in 2017. But non-voters could increase if a seg- ment of undecided voters (12% of all re- spondents) also end up not voting. This could be the case because political un- certainty is highest in those demographic groups which are less likely to vote. And two-thirds of all undecided voters say they trust neither Robert Abela nor Bernard Grech, with 17% still 'unsure' on which leader they trust most. This suggests that this uncertainty is a result of disenchantment with the political system… and not from being spoilt for choice. This means that What is clear is that both parties are losing to the "non voters party": respondents keen on not voting are not limited to a hard core, which ab- stains in every electoral appointment – 60% of current non-voters had voted PN or PL in 2017. Will indecision lead to more abstention? Significantly in 2021, both non-voters and undecided voters in MaltaToday surveys were consistently concentrated in two particular demographic groups: namely the tertiary educated and those aged between 16 and 35 years. This sug- gests that these two groups are more prone not to vote than others. From the limited information we have, it seems that the younger and more ed- ucated you are… the more likely you are dissatisfied with the political class and the more likely you are to consider not vot- ing. In fact, over one-third of both 18-35s, and the tertiary-educated are either in- tent on not voting or still undecided who to vote for. The combined percentage is now equiv- alent to the share of respondents who trust neither of the two leaders. This sug- gests that 'political agnostics' are present- ly split between those who distrust the political class, but may still opt for the lesser evil on election day; and those who are determined to go all the way and not vote. Females prevail among the former, while males among the latter category. While 13% of males say they won't vote, only 6% of women intend doing likewise; but 16% of females are undecided, only 7% of males express the same sentiment. But significantly there is less difference between men and women when it comes to lack of trust in Abela and Grech. 22% of all males trust neither Abela nor Grech, dropping to 20% for women, suggesting a larger number of females may be per- suaded to vote despite a similar lack of trust in political leaders. Too smart to party? What is also significant is the persis- tence of a high abstention rate among ed- ucated and young voters, and a far lower percentage among other voters. While the overall percentage of non-voters de- creased by one point in the past month, the percentage of non-voters among the young increased by 5 points and among the tertiary educated by 2 points. This suggests that parties are finding it easier to lure back less educated and older vot- ers, but are finding a mental block among younger and university educated voters. In the latest survey 16% of tertiary-ed- ucated respondents and 19% of 16-35s say they will not be voting, compared to just 9% of all respondents who state like- wise. Among the tertiary-educated, this percentage has oscillated between 9% in June 2021 to 23% in October 2021; among the 16-35s it changed from 15% in June to 25% in November. In contrast the percentage of non-voters drops to just 3% among the over-65s and 6% for those with secondary education. Additionally, the percentage of non-vot- ers mirrors high rates of lack of trust in both political leaders among the tertiary educated (34%) and the young (36%). In contrast only 14% of the secondary-ed- ucated and 9% of over 65s trust neither political leader. Which party is losing most support to non-voters? The big questions facing pollsters and analysts are which party is most penalised by non-voters and which party has the biggest chance of recovering at least some of them. The latest poll suggests that contrary to the narrative that the vast majority of non-voters are disillusioned PN voters, both parties are losing support to the non-voting camp, even if the PN loses out more: 32% of present non-voters voted PN in 2017, 28% voted PL. And while 5% of Labour's 2017 voters say they will not vote, this rises to 8% among the PN's 2017 voters. The sheer inability of the PN to reunite its 2017 vot- ers is testimony to its weakness when it has more room to grow among its own 2017 voting base. Even a regional analysis suggests that non-voting is highest in both the La- bour-leaning south harbour (12.5%), in the PN-leaning north (13%) and the more evenly divided western (12.2%) and Gozo regions (11.9%). So while surveys do suggest that young, educated PN-leaning voters are more represented among non-voters, a simi- lar category of former Labour voters also exists. Since respondents are only asked how they voted in 2017, this category of non-voters might include floaters who voted PN before 2013. One indication of this is the high rate of non-voters among the tertiary-educated, a category historically tilted towards the PN because of the EU issue and which also includes a higher number of floating voters. One particular category of interest could be university-educated Labour vot- ers who voted Nationalist in 2003 because of the EU, went back to Labour in 2008 or 2013, had misgivings but still voted PL in 2017, but may now have had enough. The disgruntled Labour voter Apart from 2013 switchers, a bloc of former PL voters who now say they won't vote could include principled socialists turned off by corruption and the party's proximity to big business, as well as voters who feel disgruntled because they were not given what was promised to them. It could also include educated young people hailing from Labour-inclined fam- ilies who are not keen on the PN. Absten- tion could be an attractive prospect for voters who resent Labour but also the Nationalist opposition even more. But if this happens, Labour may still win with a considerable margin, simply because these voters have not shifted their vote to the opposition. In this sense by not voting the message sent by these voters will be a weaker one than a vote for the opposition: if Labour ends up being elected by a similar margin as in 2017 despite the drop in turnout, it can easily ignore the dissenting message of non-voters. Anything short of a reduced gap be- tween the two major parties will not worry Labour. The Nationalists will have only themselves to blame for not attract-