Issue link: https://maltatoday.uberflip.com/i/1469874
maltatoday | SUNDAY • 5 JUNE 2022 9 INTERVIEW a human, or any other animal' So I think Philosophy is mak- ing a big difference. It is clearly influencing – not all, perhaps; but certainly some of the people who have the ability [through their wealth] to make differenc- es, in important directions; and who have extraordinary oppor- tunities, to make a difference for good…. I can't help but notice that – notwithstanding my own earlier question – your own approach seems to be rather consistently pragmatic, so far. For instance: in another inter- view, you once quoted from Fyodor Dostoyevsky's 'The Brothers Karamazov'… … I mentioned that same ex- ample in my lecture, yesterday… There you go. In any case, the novel presents us with a hypo- thetical scenario: 'If you could bring about eternal world peace, by torturing a child to death… would you do it?' You yourself argued (very prag- matically, I would say) that there can be no real possible circumstance, in which 'tortur- ing a child to death' could ever truly 'bring about world peace'. But… isn't that also true of other examples of 'Practical Philosophy'? Take the famous 'Trolley Problem', for exam- ple: there is very little realistic chance that any of us would ever really be in that position (i.e., to save lives, by diverting a train), either… Well… it's not so much that I reject the use of hypothetical scenarios. I think that they can be very helpful, in illustrating certain things. But I would say that the Trolley Problem is a lit- tle different, from Dostoevsky's example… because it is more of a 'thought experiment', than an actual scenario. First of all, there are two ver- sions: one where you could 'throw a switch' to divert the trolley [in which case, it would kill only one person, instead of five]; and the second is where you're standing on a footbridge, over the railway line; and the on- ly way to stop the trolley from killing those five people, is by pushing another person – some- one who would have to be 'big and heavy' enough, for the pur- pose – down from the bridge, and into its path. But the point of this experi- ment is that, when people are asked the question, 'Would it be wrong?' about both scenari- os: the vast majority reply that it 'would NOT be wrong, to throw the switch'; but that 'it WOULD be wrong, to push the heavy stranger'. And this creates a problem for philosophers: because in both cases, the outcome is the same. 'One person dies, and five peo- ple are saved'. So first of all, you need to ask the question: 'Why do people think it's different?'; and secondly: 'Is that a good reason, to think there's a differ- ence?' So the Trolley Problem ac- tually helps to illustrate things about the way people think; and it could even lead to the entire- ly Utilitarian conclusion, that – while we do have these intu- itions, that tell us that 'some things are right', while 'other things are wrong' - we shouldn't rely on those intuitions, too much. They don't really reflect any underlying 'moral truth'; so it's more important to look at the consequences of what we're actually doing. Utilitarianism is often (loosely) defined as 'striving to achieve the greater good, for the great- er number of people'. How do we define the 'greater good', though? Doesn't that depend on having a shared understand- ing of what actually constitutes 'right and wrong' (or 'good and bad') to begin with? And if, as you say, there is no 'underly- ing moral truth': isn't there a danger that the same philoso- phy could be used to justify - if you'll allow the extreme exam- ple - even the Nazi atrocities of World War II? (After all, Hitler himself did believe that his own views served the 'greater good')… Oh, consequentialism can cer- tainly be misused, in that sense. Because it depends, as you just pointed out, on a correct assess- ment of the facts. And people will have different – and some- times, very seriously mistaken – views about the facts. That's true: but I think that any moral view can be misused, in the same way. Certainly, we've seen many examples in history, when people had, for instance, very strongly-held views about the importance of 'following the One True God'… so they simply killed anybody who didn't… But I don't think it depends so much on 'having a shared un- derstanding of right and wrong'. It depends more on being will- ing to think about it; to discuss it; and to try and come up with some 'soundly-based view'. For instance: if Adolf Hitler really HAD made those claims, he would have just been… well, wrong. But even if you assume, somehow, that his crazy, racist theories about 'Aryans' being superior to 'non-Aryans' – Jews, Slavs, and others – were 'right'… it still doesn't justify the treat- ment of those Jews, Slavs and other 'non-Aryans'. No utilitar- ian, on any version of the facts, would ever be able to justify in- flicting so much suffering. Because even if you do assume that those people were 'inferi- or' - in the same way, perhaps, as other animals are often per- ceived to be inferior - a Utilitar- ian would still argue that: 'You must not let them suffer. If you can do anything to prevent their suffering… you must do so." And there are actual examples of this, from Nazi Germany. Himmler, for instance, once said [words to the effect of]: 'If 1,000 Slavs die, digging a defensive trench for Germany… I don't care, because the only thing that matters is that the trench gets built!" No Utilitarian would ever have said that: even if they really did believe that the 'best util- ity would be served, in a world that is ultimately ruled by Ger- many'. Because the suffering of those people, could still never be considered part of the 'greater good'… In a sense, this brings us back to the original notion of 'specie- sism'. You've just made a com- parison between the Nazis' de- humanisation of their victims; and the way in which 'other an- imals are often perceived to be different'. Am I right in under- standing, then, that - in terms of our ethical approach to such matters - animals should ideal- ly be treated as entirely equal to humans… at all levels, every- where? No entirely, no. First of all, the Animal Liberation viewpoint is not one that says: 'there are no differences at all, between hu- mans and other animals'. It sim- ply says that it is wrong to give greater weight to interests, on the basis that those interests be- long to members of the species 'Home sapiens'… as compared with similar interests among non-humans, in cases where such comparisons can be made. A simpler way of putting it would be: "Pain is pain; and pain is equally bad, whether it's the pain of a human, or a dog, or a pig, or a chicken, or anything, that has the capacity to feel pain…" At the same time, though – and this is a Devil's Advocate ques- tion, by the way – you have also been criticised, in the past (and even 'boycotted', in certain US states) for arguing in favour of the right to abortion, in some cases. How do you respond to the view that you seem more concerned with non-human animals, than with the human foetus? Well, once the foetus is capable of feeling pain… I AM concerned about it. In fact, if you asked the question: at what point is the foetus entitled to some kind of moral significance, or moral sta- tus… I would say it is the point at which it begins to be capable of feeling pain. But the vast majorities of abor- tions are performed before that, where possible. Even where it isn't possible, however: I don't argue - and this is true about animals, as well - that the 'capacity to feel pain' means that it is just as bad to take the life of that being, than anybody else's. I think that, when it comes to ending the life of a being, there are other factors: such as, for instance, to what extent is that being self-aware? Or capable of seeing itself as 'living, over time'? Or 'having a future', and so on? All that may make a difference, to the seriousness of killing a be- ing. But it doesn't make a differ- ence to the seriousness of inflict- ing pain on that being. So even at the point when the foetus is capable of feeling pain… there might still be reasons that would justify ending the life of that foe- tus: especially, if it could be done in a way that does not cause any serious pain. So, while the capacity for pain is morally significant; it doesn't conclusively determine the right to life, of any particular being. What it does do, however, is cre- ate obligations for us, regarding what 'should' or 'should not' be done to those beings: and obvi- ously, one of those obligations is to 'not inflict pain on them'… unless there is an overriding rea- son to do so.