Issue link: https://maltatoday.uberflip.com/i/1504697
8 maltatoday | SUNDAY • 30 JULY 2023 NEWS 1. Forged documents During the magisterial in- quiry, a calligraphy expert not- ed discrepancies in the hand- writing on the commencement notice for the works in Kordin. The licensed mason on the site of the works was supposed to be a certain John Muscat. However, it was established that he had not signed the commencement notice him- self, and that his signature on the notice was forged by Mat- thew Schembri. In Malta, construction works cannot start without a formal commencement notice submit- ted to the Planning Authority after receiving clearance from the Building Construction Authority. This notice must be signed by a mason who as- sumes responsibility of the site. Moreover, Matthew Schem- bri and Kurt Buhagiar did not appoint a licensed mason, or anyone with the equivalent technical expertise, to lead the works on site. They also did not notify the OHSA of the works. Since there was no appoint- ed supervisor as required by law, the responsibilities of the supervisor were assumed to be held by Matthew Schembri and Kurt Buhagiar as directors of AllPlus Ltd. 2. Structural deficiencies were root cause of collapse There were major deficiencies in the structural design of the building in Kordin, and it was these deficiencies that led to the collapse of the building at such a detrimental scale. One of the main indications of this is that the building col- lapsed outwards, rather than inwards. Since the outside structure was not 'tied' to- gether properly, pressure from the overlying concrete planks pushed the walls outwards. Photos exhibited in the inquiry show that the planned double walls were not tied together – a shortcoming of structural sig- nificance as a double wall tied together is four times stronger than two walls built next to each other. Other photos show that the metal bars over which concrete is laid were neither tied to the respective adjacent structures, thus reducing the building's 're- silience' in the case of an acci- dent. The inquiry also points to a spreader beam mentioned in the construction plans drawn up by the architect. However, what was missing were instruc- tions for the spreader beam to be tied to the metal bars be- tween the concrete planks. There was no interlocking system tying the walls to other parts of the structure, so the moment one wall started to col- lapse, the whole site was going to go down with it. 3. Sofia's last photo One of the last photos snapped by Jean Paul Sofia – eerily re- produced in poor quality in the published magisterial report – shows that the workers were on the roof of the construction site at the time of the collapse. It shows four workers on site ap- plying concrete to the roof. Sammy Curtis, one of the workers injured in the collapse, said that he was operating the 'ready-mix' at the time of the accident. Another worker, Boris Cutajar, was manning the con- crete pump on the roof when he looked behind him and saw part of the building collapse. "I ran and held to the pipe of the pump. I was with four other foreign workers," he said. 4. Architect's personal assets Adriana Zammit, the architect in charge of the construction works, transferred a substantial amount of money and property to third parties one month after the fatal collapse. Chats referred to in the mag- isterial inquiry indicate that the architect started transfer- ring unspecified but substantial sums of money and immovable property to third parties. The chats were between Zammit and a certain "Christian" from 3 January 2023 onwards. Additionally, the chats indi- cated that Zammit was looking to dispose of her money. The magistrate said that this alone does not constitute a crime in and of itself. Howev- er, it was noted that this fact could be relevant in the future, particularly in the eventuality that Zammit's creditors come knocking for their dues. The inquiry notes that in the future, this behaviour could be investigated since Zammit's ef- forts to transfer personal assets could indicate plans to commit fraud. 5. Fast track permitting for fac- tories In her report, the magistrate observed that the fast-tracked planning procedure for the construction of factories in in- dustrial sites is an "institutional choice" which creates a per- ception that few controls are required. "[It] strengthens the percep- tion that there is no need for many controls in the construc- tion of factories where many people are employed," the court expert observed. The Planning Authority (PA) is not responsible for the safe- ty aspect which falls under the scrutiny of the Building and Construction Authority but the inquiry suggests that the fast-track procedure contrib- utes to laxity in the sector. Factories in State-owned in- dustrial estates do not need a full PA permit but are approved through a notification system in a shorter timeframe, and in the absence of public hearings and a case officer report. According to this procedure instead of applying for a per- mit, developers are obliged to notify the Authority prior to the commencement of any work. In the Kordin factory case the development was originally ap- proved in April 2020, less than a month after the notification was presented. A tragedy written in concrete Five key takeaways from the Jean Paul Sofia magisterial inquiry The Prime Minister published the findings of the magisterial inquiry into the collapse of a timber factory under construction last year, which killed Jean Paul Sofia and injured five workers. NICOLE MEILAK leafed through the magistrate's report