Issue link: https://maltatoday.uberflip.com/i/1275149
10 maltatoday | SUNDAY • 2 AUGUST 2020 Raphael Vassallo OPINION When is a health emergency not a health emergency? THE short answer, I suppose, would have to be: "When it's not in the government's interest to call it a health emergency, of course. When else?" But while that does sum up the current situation rather neatly… it doesn't address another both- ersome little question that has been cropping up quite a lot re- cently: the one about who, with- in government, is actually call- ing all the shots when it comes to public health decisions. Is it the same people who've been advising government ever since the COVID-19 pandem- ic was first declared in early March? And if so, then… um… why is the same government reacting so very differently to today's scenario, than it did (so successfully, one might add) just a few short months ago? Reason I ask is that… well, consider for a moment what Health Minister Chris Fearne said during Thursday's press conference: "Malta's success to control the pandemic in the previous months was the result of adequate social distancing measures, profuse testing and contact tracing, and immediate isolation of positive cases. […] We intend to keep this up." Naturally, he was referring to the (now universally-acknowl- edged) fact that Malta had in- deed succeeded in keeping its local COVID-19 epidemic well under control, between March and July: so well, in fact, that we got agonisingly close to achiev- ing a rate of zero active cases… until, that is, around this time last week (when it all came crashing back down to earth with a horrible thud). As I recall, however, this same initial success – however short- lived it proved to be - was actu- ally down to a good deal more than those few factors men- tioned by Chris Fearne, above. 'Social distancing', 'testing', 'tracing', 'isolation', 'quaran- tine', etc… yes, all that certain- ly did help. But not by coinci- dence; and certainly not because of any innate self-discipline we may possess as a nation, either. No: the way I remember it, people didn't endure two whole months of isolation and social deprivation, just because their government had politely asked them to. There were, after all, a number of other restrictive measures put into in place be- tween March and late June: starting with the fact that the government itself declared an official public health emergency as early as 7 March – i.e., when the number of active cases stood at only three. In so doing, government also handed over responsibility of the situation directly to the Su- perintendence of Public Health: invoking articles 14 and 27(c) of the Public Health Act, which decree (among a heck of a lot of other things) that: > "The Superintendent may make, vary or revoke orders […] describing measures to guard against or to control dangerous epidemics or infectious disease" […] > These measures may include [inter alia]: "regulating occu- pancy in premises or any parts thereof to prevent them from being so overcrowded as to be dangerous to health"; as well as "such other action be taken as he may consider appropriate", and lastly; > "Any person who does not comply with any direction by the Superintendent given by vir- tue of this article shall be guilty of an offence against this Act." I need hardly add that the last proviso was by far the most cru- cial. The success alluded to by Faerne depended, in no small measure, upon his government's ability to enforce health recom- mendations through legislation. This same state of 'public health emergency' – declared at such an early stage in the crisis – paved the way to all the oth- er subsequent restrictions and regulations introduced over the next few weeks: including the closure of the airports and har- bour to all non-essential travel on 11 March. The following day, govern- ment also announced the im- mediate closure of all schools, universities and child-care cen- tres… a measure that was later extended to all restaurants, bars, cafes, hairdressers, retail out- lets, kiosks, gyms, and so on. There was also an immedi- ate, overnight ban on all public gatherings of more than three people: including sports events, theatre, cinema, live music, re- ligious feasts, and even picnics. But it all started with that early recognition – back in the first week of March – that the situ- ation was, in fact, an emergen- cy; and it continued with drastic measures that could only ever be justified on the basis of an emergency. So if people ended up dutiful- ly following the health authori- ties' instructions on the subject of social distancing – with such undeniably positive results for Malta's struggle against COV- ID-19 – well, it was partly be- cause they had no real choice in the matter. With virtually all entertain- ment venues closed, and no bars or restaurants to even socialise in… it was almost impossible to get within three metres of any- one else anyway. But that's before factoring in the penalties. For none of these measures was in any way 'voluntary', you know. On 22 March, Chris Fearne himself announced that infringements of the new quarantine regula- tions would be liable to a €3,000 fine… which was later bumped up to €10,000. Meanwhile, hardly a week went by without reports of ran- dom on-the-spot fines, handed down to anyone in groups of more than three… or who failed to observe the mandatory mini- mum distances while queuing at the vegetable van, or at an ATM. Admittedly, his own govern- ment would go on to suggest the possibility of 'refunding' some of those fines through some form of 'amnesty'... only to hast- ily retract the suggestion after a public outcry. But both the idea of an am- nesty, in itself - and also the irate popular reactions: mostly from people who argued (quite rightly) that it would 'defeat the entire purpose of enforcement' – also illustrate just how instru- Today, on the other hand, we are facing a situation that (on paper, at any rate), appears to be much more volatile than anything we went through in the early phases of the crisis