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WORLD 14 maltatoday | WEDNESDAY • 9 AUGUST 2023 AT the very end of July, Ukrainian forc- es liberated Staromaiorske, a tiny village in southeastern Ukraine. It wasn't a full breakthrough — at least not yet. But it was a real victory in Ukraine's otherwise lackluster weeks-old counteroffensive. Ukraine had tried to tamp down ex- pectations about the counteroffensive long before it had begun. But Kyiv's past successes and Moscow's past failures, the deliveries of new advanced West- ern weapons, and a fresh crop of West- ern-trained Ukrainian recruits all had a lot of folks very hyped — maybe overly so — about what Kyiv could achieve. This, despite sober analysis from plen- ty of observers who said this counter- offensive would more likely be a slog, especially given the impressive, heavily mined Russian fortifications along a vast front line. Experts were also uncertain how well Ukrainian troops would be able to maneuver with advanced weap- ons, like main battle tanks, and whether they could overcome supply and logis- tics challenges. The good news is that, weeks into a counteroffensive, we have some clear- er answers to those questions. The bad news is those answers were not great, if you're Ukraine or its backers. Russian for- tifications are as formidable as advertised. Western equipment can withstand a lot, but vast minefields are vast minefields, and Kyiv and its newly trained forces have largely failed at conducting combined arms operations on a large scale — that is, coordinating troops and all this different weaponry, like armored vehicles and ar- tillery, to blitz through Russian lines. Kyiv has also suffered high casualties in its at- tempts to do so. Ukraine knows this, and has now shift- ed strategies to a much more attritional approach, trying to degrade Russian forc- es and logistics as it focuses its operation on three axes of attack. "It's not so much about killing Russian troops at the front line, but more weakening some critical enablers like artillery — but also things like command posts, ammunition sup- plies, electronic warfare systems, air de- fense systems, these sorts of things," said Niklas Masuhr, a military analyst at the Center for Security Studies at the Federal Institute of Technology Zurich. It is a cautious and methodical ap- proach, said Federico Borsari, who focus- es on defense and transatlantic security at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). It helps reduce the number of casualties Ukrainian troops suffer, but it forces Kyiv to rely more heavily on artil- lery. It is slow going, by design. This model has favored Ukraine's mil- itary in the past. That does not make this a surefire strategy. Russia, again, has learned from past mistakes, and the battlefield dynamics have changed since Ukraine retook parts of the Kharkiv re- gion and forced a Russian retreat in Kher- son last year. That makes this next phase of the coun- teroffensive far from certain. "Phase 1 probably failed, but doesn't mean they can't win," said Patrick Bury, a senior lec- turer in security at the University of Bath. "They can still win in Phase 4 or 3 or 5, even, this summer. What it means is that there's less time in which to do that." Russian defenses have made things very, very difficult for Ukraine Ukraine's progress in its counteroffen- sive is being measured in hundreds of meters, as a Pentagon official character- ized it to Politico last week. Russian de- fenses are a big reason why. Russian fortifications in Ukraine are some of the most extensive in Europe since World War II, stretching across the front lines, from Kherson in the south all the way to the north. The Rus- sian military spent months in advance of the counteroffensive digging in, building layers and layers of complex anti-tank defenses. The minefields, most of all, have sty- mied Ukraine. The Ukrainian front line is carpeted with mines, miles deep. They are trip-wired or booby-trapped. Even if Ukraine's Western armored vehicles can withstand the blasts, the layers of anti-tank mines hinder forward move- ment, leaving them vulnerable. "As soon as Ukrainian units become stuck in an area, they are immediately targeted by artillery, drones, and attack helicopters," Borsari said. Russia has built trenches that are filled with explosives, so when Ukraine approaches, prepared to clear a Russian position, Russian forces can det- onate them remotely. All of this is making Ukraine's pro- gress incremental and slow, which gives Russia time to re-fortify and re-mine, further impeding Ukrainian movement. "The whole dilemma for Ukraine is ac- tually one of maneuver, because to over- come prepared Russian defensive lines, you need to force Russian movement," said Oscar Jonsson, founder of Phrone- sis Analysis and researcher at Swedish Defence University. Russia has had other advantages in ar- tillery and aviation — particularly its use of attack helicopters, which have been able to pick off Ukrainian targets beyond the protection of Ukraine's air defens- es. On the whole, Russia has managed to make adjustments and compensate for some of its weaknesses. It has done things like trying to keep its artillery launchers and ammunition dumps far- ther out of range of Ukrainian fire. "It would be really stupid to not grant the Russians the ability to learn from their mistakes and to adapt constantly — and What went wrong in Ukraine's In the early days of the counteroffensive, Ukrainian forces attempted to break through Russian lines with mechanised combined arms formations, but these were largely repulsed by Russia because of its deep defenses