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MT 9 November 2014

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12 ACCORDING to the well-known television investment warning, "past performance is no guarantee for the future". The same general principle seems to apply to public service employ- ment, too. Perhaps it is an unfair perception, but there is a widespread view that promotion up the salary scale in such institutions as the Po- lice Force is not necessarily related to work performance at all. It was in part to address this per- ception that an agreement was re- cently struck between the ministry for home affairs and the office of the prime minister. According to the new regulations, the appoint- ments of Commissioner of Police, Deputy Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner "are to be made on a performance agreement at par with headship positions [in the civil serv- ice]… Hence, it is clarified that these appointments will no longer be con- sidered as grades". Minister Manuel Mallia would later defend this agreement on the ground that it would "ensure that the per- formance of the most senior officers of the police force was continuously assessed and that they continued to give the best of their abilities". That, at any rate, was the declared intention. Viewed from another per- spective, the same agreement can also be viewed as a direct attempt to undermine the autonomy of the Po- lice Force. The Malta Police Association (MPA) issued a press statement to that effect this week, which also in- dicated that the change from per- manent to temporary contracts may even constitute government intimi- dation of the police: "It is of utmost importance that the highest officials within the force are not conditioned by the fear of being fired from their roles if they take a decision which does not suit the Executive," the MPA warned. Similar concerns have since been raised by the Opposition. I meet the MPA president, Sergeant Neville Mercieca, at the association's headquarters in Marsa, and in be- tween endless interruptions by tel- ephones armed with every ringtone known to man, we somehow manage to discuss the main issues surround- ing this agreement... which in actual fact is an addendum to a previous agreement signed in August 2012. In what way, exactly, does he con- sider this addendum to undermine the autonomy of the police? "Let's start with a little background. In the civil service, people are ap- pointed to headship positions on three-year contracts, which can be renewed. In the police corps, we are not against that on principle. We cer- tainly don't agree that just because someone becomes an assistant com- missioner, he can simply occupy that position for 10 years without giving something back to society…" But the new agreement, which came into force on 29 October, seems to supplant existing regula- tions governing the police force, and as such has created more uncertainty than it clarified. "We are already regulated by the Police Act, Chapter 164. It gov- erns all aspects of the corps, down to pensions. There are clauses that can be evoked to remove someone from the police force, or for demo- tions. So we didn't need this [new agreement] that just came out. If they wanted to amend these condi- tions they can make the necessary changes to Chapter 164 in parlia- ment – the government has a right to legislate on these matters, we're not contesting that – but what concerns us are the amendments themselves. We don't want the police to fall un- der the auspices of the home affairs minister, or any other branch of the Executive. It should fall under the Public Service Commission. For in- stance, when it comes to the removal of judges, it is not the individual min- ister who decides. The matter goes to parliament…" His example might not be the most fortunate one, given that repeated efforts to impeach judges have failed in the past. In fact, while one may certainly sympathise with the MPA's overall cause for concern – police autonomy being a fundamental building block of the state, and all that – one could also argue that the association's complaints stem from a desire to retain the status quo. If the MPA genuinely agrees with the de- clared aims of the new regulations… what would be the ideal way to reach the same objective without jeopard- ising police autonomy? "A board needs to be set up. The details would obviously need to be discussed among all the stakehold- ers: including ourselves, when we be- come a union, but not just us. There should be a wider discussion on how this will be regulated. What we don't want is for decisions to be left solely to the executive. We believe the Po- lice Corps should be totally cut off from the executive arm of the state. Not just from the minister or even the government. It could be the speaker of the house, for instance. The problem is that it is not healthy to have one person taking the deci- sions…" As for the MPA's own motives, Mercieca dismisses any notion that the association opposes the agree- ment's basic aims. "Of course we agree with accountability; God for- bid we didn't, in 2014. The main problem with this agreement is that it isn't 100% clear. This is our con- cern: it's like the law, which is subject to interpretation…" The actual law, however, is a good deal more detailed than the adden- dum which supplants it. Quoting again from Chapter 164, Mercieca traces a clear chain of command in the decision-making process govern- ing appointments and conditions of different police ranks. "It says that the decision is to be taken by the PM after consultation with the Public Service Commission. As you know, the PSC board has members of both government and opposition. There is a divergence of opinion. The advice given to the PM would be the result of agreement between different positions. It is fair that way: the PSC is balanced…" Mercieca seems to be suggesting that there was no need for any new agreement at all, given that the situ- ation is already well regulated at law. How, then, does he interpret this development? Does he suspect any ulterior motives? He shrugs. "All I can say is that I did not know about this agreement until now. As for ulterior motives, no, I don't think anything like that. It's not the same for a policeman to suspect ulterior motives. If I did sus- pect anything, I would have to inves- tigate it as a possible breach of law. I can't 'suspect' anything in that sense, without valid cause..." Meanwhile, however, there is also a certain consistency – for better or worse – in the present administra- tion approach to such matters. At the risk of playing the devil's advocate: the Labour government was elected in 2013 precisely on the expectation that it would reform certain sec- tors, including the police. One of its earlier interventions was a surprise visit by the home affairs minister to the Corradino Correctional Facility, which exposed certain shortcom- ings and led to certain administra- tive changes. So couldn't this move likewise be interpreted as a more hands-on attempt to address similar shortcomings in the police force? "We have no objection to that. The minister can come to the depot, too. It's not a problem. And we agree that there has to be more accountability. We don't want a situation where an officer is promoted to the rank of sergeant, just to get comfortable, make coffee, wait until the end of his service and retire without doing any- thing. But at the same time, our in- terpretation of this agreement is that it will be only the minister, a repre- sentative of the executive, who will decide… or any one person. It won't be a board which reflects diversity of opinion, like the PSC…" Inevitably, the MPA's objections to the recent addendum also highlight another of its long-standing con- cerns: the fact that the Malta police force, unlike some of their equivalent forces in other European countries, is denied the right to collective bar- gaining. For this reason, the MPA had no direct input in either the 2012 agree- ment or the recent amendments. There is however a difference be- tween the two scenarios. "With the agreement of 2012, we got certain allowances we didn't have before. Certain anomalies in the sal- ary scale were rectified. When the negotiations were going on, we were never involved in the sense that we signed the agreement, or anything like that. But back then John Rizzo, who was police commissioner at the time, would be present at the negoti- ating table…" Did he consult the MPA? "Yes, he would come to us and say: this is what is being proposed, what do you think? So even if these agreements don't have our signatures as MPA, step by step we knew what was hap- pening throughout the entire proc- ess…" And the MPA agreed with those conditions at the time… "We agreed, but not with every- thing. Obviously we had our own bargaining position… if we asked for 10, we got five… but we can't ar- gue with that; there was input from our side, and we got part of what we wanted. But this," here he indicates a print-out of the recent addendum on the table, "this was added onto an agreement which we had been in- volved in. So what we had agreed to has now been changed. And we don't know anything about this change. We don't know who was consulted, how it was agreed… we're not even sure who it applies to…" Has the MPA raised this concern with either the minister or the police commissioner? Interview By Raphael Vassallo maltatoday, SUNDAY, 9 NOVEMBER 2014 Undermining police UNEQUAL PAY I am scale 11, for example. Across the road there is MEPA, also part of the same salary structure. Why should someone there earn the same wages as myself at scale 11, when I work six more hours a week? POLICE AUTONOMY What will happen as a result of this agreement? You might think, 'my contract will be up for renewal in a few months' time…' It might affect the decisions you make, and the way you approach your job

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